National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Legislation: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis Also Hits Renters by Salsich, Peter W.
Saint Louis University School of Law 
Scholarship Commons 
All Faculty Scholarship 
2009 
National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Legislation: The 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis Also Hits Renters 
Peter W. Salsich 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Housing Law Commons 
No. 2009 - 08 
National Affordable Housing Trust Fund 
Legislation: The Subprime Mortgage Crisis Also 
Hits Renters 
Peter W. Salsich 
Saint Louis University School of Law 
ARTICLES
National Affordable Housing Trust Fund




Compromise legislation, the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 20081,
enacted in response to the subprime mortgage-induced foreclosure crisis,2
includes a new program of direct federal financial support for production and
preservation of housing for extremely low-income families.3 Included, some
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1. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(effective July 30, 2008, to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501-4520).
2. David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Gives Final Approval to Sweeping Housing Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July
27, 2008, available at www.nytimes.com/2008/07/270washington/26cnd-housing.html (last visited July
26, 2008). HERA did not end the crisis, and a massive additional rescue program authorizing up to $700
billion for government acquisition of troubled mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, as well as
government investment in troubled financial institutions, was enacted a few weeks later, Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008), as Pub. L. 110-343; Steve Lohr, U.S.
Investing $250 Billion to Bolster Bank Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2008), at p. A1. The Housing Trust
Fund legislation, while it continued to be challenged, was not changed or eliminated by this new
legislative initiative. National Low Income Housing Colation (“NLIHC”), National Housing Trust Fund:
National Housing Trust Fund Attacked Again By House Minority Leader, 13 MEMO TO MEMBERS
No. 40, Oct. 10, 2008, at 1, and Sen. Bennett Optimistic About National Housing Trust Fund , 13 MEMO
TO MEMBERS No. 40, Oct. 10, 2008, at 1.
3. The last major piece of housing legislation authorizing new programs was the Quality Housing and
Work Responsibility Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2594 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437z
(2003)), which made major changes in the public housing program including creation of the HOPE VI
program which enabled local public housing authorities to recast urban high-rise public housing units
into mixed-income, mixed-use neighborhoods.
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might say buried,4 in this massive Act is a mechanism, the Housing Trust Fund, to
provide a dedicated source of funds5 for affordable housing production and
preservation.6 For the first time in a generation,7 the federal government returns
as a serious player in its efforts to improve the housing lot of the nation’s
lowest-income families.
The main thrusts of the Act respond to the subprime mortgage crisis with
foreclosure relief programs,8 greater oversight of the mortgage purchase
activities of the government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”), the Federal Na-
tional Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”),9 and authorization for the Treasury
Department to intervene to prevent the two agencies from collapsing.10 The
Housing Trust Fund is the part of the compromise legislation crafted by
Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass,), chair of the House Committee on
Financial Services, and Senators Christopher J. Dodd (D-Conn.), chair of the
Senate Banking Committee, and Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.), senior Republican
on the committee, that the Democratic Party co-sponsors believe is most
4. Herszenhorn, supra note 2. This article announcing final passage of the bill, was posted on the New
York Times website shortly after the Senate vote but made no mention of the new program. Likewise, the
Wall Street Journal and USA Today made no mention of the Housing Trust Fund in their Monday, July 28
reports of the Senate’s weekend vote. Damien Paletta, Housing Bill Relies On Banks to Take Loan Losses,
WALL ST. J., July 28, 2008, at A3; Anna Bahney, Housing Rescue Bill May Fall Short; Who Benefits?
USATODAY, July 28, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2008-07-26-
housing-bailout-bill_N.htm (discussing six groups intended to benefit from the bill, but not mentioning
extremely low-income households).
5. Advocates have sought a dedicated revenue source for affordable housing production and
preservation since the early 1990s. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
6. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, at § 1131, adding new § 1338
to the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, 12 U.S.C. §§ 4501
(1992). See infra Part IV.
7. In the 1980s, the federal government shifted its emphasis from direct support to indirect support of
housing production with the enactment of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”), Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 252 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2008)), and from supply-side (production) programs to
demand-side (rental support) programs such as the Section 8 housing certificate and voucher programs,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(r) & (o) (1999), merged in 1998 into a single tenant-based rental assistance program,
Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 545, 112 Stat. 2596, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o).
8. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, at §§ 1401-1404, adding new § 257 to
title II of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1707 et seq. (2008), creating the HOPE for Homeowners
Program to enable homeowners to avoid threatened foreclosures by authorizing FHA to insure up to $300
billion in “refinanced eligible mortgages” and by authorizing the Government National Mortgage
Association (“GNMA” or “Ginnie Mae”) to guarantee securities backed by such mortgages. Id. at
§ 257(e) & (m).
9. The legislation creates a new agency, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, to oversee the
government-sponsored enterprises, Federal National Mortgage Association and Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation. Id. at § 1101, adding a new § 1311 to the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial
Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, 12 U.S.C. § 4501 (1992). Less than 60 days after the legislation was
signed into law, the new agency assumed control of the GSEs. See infra Part IV.
10. The Treasury Department’s temporary investment authority, which expires December 31, 2009,
Id. § 1117, is limited only by the federal debt limit, which was raised in the bill from $9.8 trillion to
$10.615 trillion. Id. § 3083, amending 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b).
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A key feature of the Housing Trust Fund provision is the requirement that all
monies distributed to grantees of the Housing Trust Fund must be used to benefit
people in the lower quartile of income for the area in which they live:
Seventy-five percent of the monies are earmarked for extremely low-income
households,12 defined as those whose income “is not in excess of 30 per centum
of the area median income,” and the remaining 25% are for very low-income
households (50% of area media income).13 National median income averages can
give real meaning to these definitions, although the actual median incomes will
vary from area to area. Based on the Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s calculation of an average area median income of $59,400 for
fiscal year 2008, extremely low-income households, on average, make no more
than $17,820.14 This is almost $3,400 below the poverty level established as
income of $21,201 for a family of four.15 Very low-income households, on
average, make $29,700 or less,16 which is almost $8,500 more than the
established poverty level income for a family of four.17
The Housing Trust Fund targeting provision is a reminder of the special
housing plight of people living in poverty. While people in the middle and upper
income ranges may have choices concerning homeownership, people in the lower
quartile income range have little choice but to rent,18 and few communities
willingly accept rental housing. The National Low Income Housing Coalition
(“NLIHC”), a major advocate for the Housing Trust Fund, states flatly that its
research leads to “one unmistakable conclusion: no rental market in America can
11. Senator Dodd stated that the Housing Trust Fund “is the part of the bill that will have the greatest
long-term impact,” and Representative Frank stated that it is “what I’m most proud of.” David S. Broder,
When Congress Works, WASH. POST, July 31, 2008, at A19.
12. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289. § 1338(c)(7)(A) (beginning
in the second year of operation).
13. Id. § 1338 (f)(1) & (6), defining “Extremely Low-Income Renter Household” and “Very
Low-Income Renter Household.”
14. NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COAL., OUT OF REACH 2007-2008, Online Guide to Data Usage
and Sources 1 (2008), available at http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2008/onlineguide.pdf. OUT OF REACH
2009 was published in April, 2009, http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2009 (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). That
release came at the end of the final editing process, and the 2007-2008 figures were retained in this article.
15. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PRELIMINARY ESTIMATES OF WEIGHTED AVERAGE POVERTY THRESHOLDS FOR
2007 (Jan. 18, 2008), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/07prelim.html.
16. Fifty percent of the national median income of $59,400. Id.
17. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 15.
18. See, e.g., Anne B. Shlay, Low-income Homeownership: American Dream or Delusion? 43 URBAN
STUD., n. 3, Mar. 2006, 511, 526-527 (“On the demand side, the vast majority of renters cannot be served
by the most lenient available underwriting standards because of economic problems. On the supply side,
the affordable housing stock for the low-income homeownership market is not readily available”). Even
the Habitat for Humanity program, which provides homeownership opportunities to low-income
households primarily by recruiting volunteers to donate building materials and to help with construction
and by utilizing the “sweat equity” of its prospective homeowners, requires regular incomes in the
25-50% of median income range. See, e.g., HABITAT FOR HUMANITY-ST. LOUIS, OWNING A HABITAT
HOME, available at http://www.habitatstl.org/homeownership (last visited July 11, 2008).
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offer low income Americans safe harbor from unaffordable housing.”19
Approximately 18.5 million households made, on average, $29,700 or less in
2005, which qualifies them as very low-income under the Housing Trust Fund
targeting provisions, with about nine million of those households making, on
average, $17,800 or less per year, qualifying them as extremely low-income
under those targeting provisions.20 Given the sheer size of the extremely low and
very low-income cohorts, the answer to the question of whether the federal
government has a role to play in responding to this group’s housing needs appears
self evident. In an earlier article,21 I argued that the federal government should be
willing to preempt local land use regulations when such regulations interfere with
the implementation of federally supported affordable housing initiatives. In this
article, I conclude that creation of the national Housing Trust Fund is both a
reasonable and an appropriate component of a comprehensive response to the
mortgage crisis.
Part II examines the housing affordability concerns of extremely low-income
households, as described by the NLIHC in its annual publication, Out of Reach
2007-2008,22 and reflected in the basic family budget calculations of the
Economic Policy Institute.23 Part III examines the impact of the subprime
mortgage foreclosure crisis, particularly on households in the lower income
cohorts. Part IV summarizes the Act’s regulatory reform and foreclosure relief
provisions and reviews the Housing Trust Fund provisions.
Part V analyzes the Housing Trust Fund debate and concludes that the Act’s
emphasis on the extremely low-income cohort is the appropriate focus of this
new federal housing development policy. The Housing Trust Fund responds to
the housing concerns of persons who have the least ability to compete for
affordable and decent housing in the private market and for whom homeowner-
ship may be an unrealistic dream. The creation of a dedicated source of funds,
while modest in amount at the outset, acknowledges the great difficulty that
supporters of housing programs for extremely low-income persons have had in
the give-and-take of the legislative process, and it makes a strong policy
statement—that the federal government has an important role to play in
improving the housing conditions of this segment of the populace. A compromise
provision that was included in the legislation, which postpones full implementa-
tion of the Housing Trust Fund for three years and uses the first year’s allocation
entirely for foreclosure relief, is justified by the impact of the subprime mortgage
19. OUT OF REACH 2007-2008, supra note 14, at 3.
20. DANILO PELLETIERE, HOUSING AT THE HALF: A MID-DECADE PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE 2005
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 6 (2008) (reporting nine million extremely low-income renter
households but only 6.2 affordable rental units); OUT OF REACH 2007-2008., supra note 14, at 6-7.
21. Peter W. Salsich, Toward a Policy of Heterogeneity: Overcoming A Long History of Socioeco-
nomic Segregation in Housing, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459 (2007)
22. OUT OF REACH 2007-2008, supra note 14.
23. See, e.g., SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO, BASIC FAMILY BUDGETS (Economic Policy Institute briefing paper
#165, Sept. 1, 2005), available at http://www.epi.org/content.cfm/bp165.
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industry’s collapse. Some members of the extremely low-income cohort still will
benefit from this allocation because of the increasing numbers of renters affected
by foreclosures against their landlords.
I. HOUSING AFFORDABILITY CONCERNS OF EXTREMELY LOW-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS
While the plight of homeowners facing the sticker shock of adjustable-rate
mortgage interest rate resets has captured the attention of the country,24 far less
attention has been paid to the increasing difficulty of extremely low-income
renters—whether they are working full time at lower-paying jobs or they are
elderly or disabled—to be able to afford their housing costs. Two ways to
measure this difficulty are the Housing Wage concept of the NLIHC and the
Basic Family Budget concept of the Economic Policy Institute (“EPI”).
A. NLIHC Housing Wage—“Out of Reach”?
Since 1998 the NLIHC has annually measured25 what it describes as the “long
standing and steadily growing gap between wages and the cost of rental
housing.”26 Using what it calls a “Housing Wage,” the NLIHC measures the
affordability of rental housing in “every county, metropolitan area, and state in
the country.”27 The NLIHC defines its “Housing Wage” as:
the full-time (40 hours/week for 52 weeks) hourly wage one would need to earn
in order to pay what the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) estimates to be the Fair Market Rent (“FMR”) for an apartment where
you live, spending no more that 30% of your income on housing costs.28
Applying this formula on a national-average basis, the NLIHC concludes that in
2008 a full-time worker must make slightly over $36,000 (i.e. $17.32, the
24. See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Homing in on Foreclosure, ABA J. 54 (July 2008); M.P. Dunleavey,
Sleepless and Worried in My House, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/07/12/business/12cost.html?refbusiness&pagewantedprint; Patrik Jonsson, Vacant Homes Spread
Blight in Suburb and City Alike, CRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 1, 2008, available at http://
www.csmonitor.com/2008/0702/p01s01-usgn.html; Lara Farrar, Is America’s Suburban Dream Collaps-
ing into a Nightmare? CNN, June 16, 2008, available at http://edition.cnn.com/2008/TECH/06/16/
suburb.city/?imwY&irefmpstoryemail.
25. NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COAL., OUT OF REACH 1998: RENTAL HOUSING AT WHAT COST?,
available at http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor1998.
26. OUT OF REACH 2007-2008, supra note 14, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 3. Since enactment of the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-101, § 206(d)(6), 97 Stat. 1180-1181 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(2)(A)(i) (1999)), all federal rental
housing assistance programs use the 30% of income standard. For a review of housing affordability
standards in federal housing policy, see DANILO PELLETIERE, GETTING TO THE HEART OF HOUSING’S
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION: HOW MUCH CAN A FAMILY AFFORD? (2008), available at www.nlihc.org.
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national Housing Wage for that year, x 40 hours/week x 52 weeks) “in order to
afford” a two-bedroom rental unit at the $900/month national average FMR.29 At
$17,800, the average extremely low-income household earns less than half of
what is necessary to afford the national average FMR, thereby creating an
average affordability gap of just under 51%.30
As a result, according to an NLIHC analysis of data from the 2003 American
Housing Survey, “an absolute shortage of just fewer than 1.7 million affordable
rental units” existed for the 7.7 million extremely low-income households in
2003.31 By 2005, this shortage had grown to 2.8 million units for approximately
nine million households.32 Nothing of significance has happened to reduce this
gap in the intervening years.
Of course, a national average is just that—an average. The situation in
individual states and cities is different, but a pattern emerges. As the Housing
Wage goes up or down in particular localities, the housing affordability gap for
extremely low-income households also widens or narrows.33 States and metropoli-
tan areas located in the coastal areas generally have larger affordability gaps than
do states in the country’s mid-section.34 But even the relatively more affordable
areas have affordability gaps above 30 percent,35 meaning that households at the
top of the extremely low-income range (in the neighborhood of $17,000/year)
can afford no more than 70 cents per rental dollar when one or more of its
members are working full time. Someone working full time at minimum wage
levels (earning in the neighborhood of $13,000/year at $6.55/hr., as of July 2008)
can afford even less.
For example, the FMR for Arizona is $827 for a two-bedroom apartment. The
Arizona Housing Wage is $33,074 per annum ($15.90/hr. x 40 hours/week x 52
weeks) for a two-bedroom unit, whereas the extremely low-income maximum is
$17,713 per annum (i.e. 30% of the area [state] median income (“AMI”) of
$59,043), which is 53.5% of Arizona’s Housing Wage, thereby creating an
affordability gap of 46.5%.36 The FMR for the Phoenix metropolitan area ($862)
is higher that the state FMR ($827), as is the Phoenix area AMI ($64,200). The
Phoenix area Housing Wage is $34,480 per annum and the extremely low-income
maximum is $19,260 per annum (55.8% of the Phoenix area Housing Wage—or
29. OUT OF REACH 2007-2008, supra note 14, at 4. The FMR is “HUD’s best estimate of what a
household seeking a modest rental unit in a short amount of time can expect to pay for rent and utilities
in the current market.” Id. at 9. (Emphasis in original.)
30. OUT OF REACH 2007-2008 supra note 14 and accompanying text.
31. DANILO PELLETIERE, THE RENTAL HOUSING AFFORDABILITY GAP: COMPARISON OF 2001 AND 2003
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEYS 4 (2006).
32. DANILO PELLETIERE, supra note 20.
33. OUT OF REACH 2007-2008, supra note 14, at 6-7.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. OUT OF REACH 2007-2008 supra note 14, at AZ, available at http://www.nlihc.org/oor/oor2008/
data.cfm?getstateon&stateAZ.
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an affordability gap of 44.2%).37
In Connecticut, the statistics are similar, but even higher. Connecticut reports a
$84,259 per annum state AMI, a $43,911 per annum state Housing Wage for
two-bedroom units, and a $25,278 per annum extremely low-income maximum
(57.5% of Connecticut’s Housing Wage—or an affordability gap of 42.5%); for
the Stamford-Norwalk metropolitan area: a $117,800 per annum AMI (the
highest in the nation), a $65,680 per annum area Housing Wage, and a $35,340
per annum extremely low-income maximum (53.8% of the area’s Housing
Wage—or an affordability gap of 46.2%).38
Georgia has an extremely low-income affordability gap (39%). It has a
$59,373 per annum state AMI, $29,084 state Housing Wage for two-bedroom
units, and a $17,812 per annum extremely low-income maximum (61% of area
Housing Wage); the Atlanta metropolitan area has a $69,200 per annum AMI, a
$32,960 per annum area Housing Wage, and a $20,760 per annum extremely
low-income maximum (63% of the area’s Housing Wage—or an affordability
gap of 37%).39
Missouri has an extremely low-income affordability gap (33.5%). It has a
$57,300 per annum state AMI, a $25,846 state Housing Wage for two-bedroom
units, and a $17,190 extremely low-income maximum (66.5% of the state’s
Housing Wage); St. Louis metropolitan area has a $65,000 per annum AMI, a
$28,440 area Housing Wage for two-bedroom units, and a $19,500 extremely
low-income maximum (68.6% of area Housing Wage—or an affordability gap of
31.4%).40
Ohio has an affordability gap of 34.6%. It has a $59,362 per annum state AMI,
a $27,191 state Housing Wage for two-bedroom units, and a $17,809 extremely
low-income maximum (65.4% of state Housing Wage); Cincinnati metropolitan
area has a $66,200 per annum AMI, a $29,040 area Housing Wage for
two-bedroom units, and a $19,860 extremely low-income maximum (68.3% of
area Housing Wage—or an affordability gap of 31.7%).41
The affordability gap problem affects millions of people. According to the
NLIHC, more than half of the 36.5 million renter households (approximately
18.5 million) “do not earn enough to afford the average FMR for an appropriately-
sized unit in their state.”42 Complicating the picture is the fact that such renters
face increasing competition for affordable units from former homeowners who
have lost their homes through foreclosure,43 as well as from developers seeking
37. Id.
38. Id. at CT.
39. Id. at GA.
40. Id. at MO.
41. Id. at OH.
42. OUT OF REACH 2007-2008, supra note 14, at 6-7.
43. See, e.g., Rachel L. Swarns, Rise in Renters Erasing Gains for Ownership, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/21/us/21renters.html?th&emcth&pagewanted
print (discussing competition for rental units).
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to convert such units to condominiums.44
B. EPI’s Basic Family Budgets
The Economic Policy Institute’s “basic family budget” calculation provides
another way of thinking about the housing needs of families in the extremely
low-income cohort.45 Basic family budgets are “relative measures of what
incomes are necessary to attain a specific standard of living” for different family
sizes living in specific communities.46 Seven items are included in basic family
budget calculations: housing (based on FMR calculations), food (based on the
Department of Agriculture’s “low-cost plan”), transportation (National Travel
Household Survey calculations for owning and operating a car),47 child care
(Children’s Defense Fund figures for child care centers for four and eight year
olds), health care (a “weighted average” of group and non-group health insurance
premiums, along with out-of-pocket expenses), other necessities (e.g., clothing,
personal care expenses, household supplies, etc.), and taxes (federal Social
Security, Medicare payroll taxes, and federal, state and local income taxes).48
Similar to the NILHC’s Housing Wage, the EPI’s basic family budget is a
relative measure of the costs of a “relatively safe, modest standard of living.”49
Advocates of the basic family budget approach stress that the dynamic nature of
the basic family budget analysis is superior to the absolute income levels of
poverty thresholds because the basic family budget recognizes the “importance
of accounting for cost-of-living variations” in the budgetary calculations.50
An EPI comparison of basic family budgets for a four-person family (two
adults and two children) in eight metropolitan areas illustrates the point about
cost of living variations, particularly with respect to housing and child care costs.
In the EPI analysis, Casper, Wyoming is at the low end with monthly housing
costs of $470 and monthly child care costs of $595, while Boston, Massachusetts
and Oakland, California have the highest housing costs with FMRs of $1,266 and
$1,342 and Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota and Washington, D.C. lead the child
care category with costs of $1,364 and $1,316.51
44. See, e.g., Kirstin Downey, Low-Cost Housing Eliminated, But Nothing Built In Its Place, WASH.
POST, Nov. 5, 2007, at p. B1 (describing failed condominium conversion projects in the Washington, D.C.
suburbs).
45. SYLVIA ALLEGRETTO, supra note 23, at 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. Ms. Allegretto’s paper discusses family budgets for the year 2004. The sharp increases in
transportation and food costs triggered by the spike in oil prices in 2007-2008 obviously affect budget
calculations.
48. Id. See MICHAEL E. STONE, SHELTER POVERTY (1993) (discussing earlier measure of housing
affordability that took a similar approach).
49. ALLEGRETTO, supra note 23, at 4.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Id, at 6. In 2007, the poverty threshold for a family of four was $21,201. U. S. CENSUS BUREAU,
supra note 15.
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A major feature of the basic family budget calculation is its relationship to the
poverty threshold calculation. Basic family budget calculations produce cost
estimates well in excess of traditional poverty threshold calculations. The basic
family budget for Boston, Massachusetts, $64,656, was over three times the
poverty threshold of $19,157 in 200452 for a four person family, and mid-cost
cities such as Charlotte, North Carolina and Denver, Colorado have basic family
budgets, $42,732 and $47,520 respectively, well over twice the poverty
threshold. The FMR method of calculating housing costs becomes the second
largest item in the basic family budget, with only child care consuming a greater
portion of the budget. Almost 30 percent of working families “have incomes
below basic family budget levels,” which is three times the number of such
families with incomes “below the official poverty thresholds” and approximately
the same as the “percentage of families living below twice poverty, 28 percent.”53
Both methods of analyzing housing costs for low income families, the Housing
Wage and the basic family budget, lead to the same conclusion—a far greater
number of American families have serious housing affordability concerns than
more conventional methods of analysis would suggest. This fact adds consider-
able weight to the argument for a new federal affordable housing policy.54
Furthermore, the subprime mortgage foreclosure crisis, discussed in Part III,
offers additional evidence of the housing plight of the extremely low-income
cohort.
II. IMPACT AND CAUSES OF THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS
A. Impact
As the subprime55 mortgage-induced foreclosure crisis deepened over the
spring and summer of 2008,56 reports surfaced calling attention to the fact that
52. ALLEGRETTO, supra note 23, at 5.
53. Id. at 6.
54. See, e.g., HARV. JOINT CTR FOR HOUSING STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2008 at 4
available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/scn/index.htm (“new directions for policy”); OUT OF REACH
2007-2008, supra note 14, at 8 (“working to lower the cost of housing and to raise the incomes of
low-income people are two ways to help bring America’s affordable housing crisis to an end”).
55. Subprime loans are loans that are “offered to people who have problems with their credit.” Interest
rates generally are higher than prevailing rates to account for the “additional risks involved in lending to
someone with poor credit or without a financial track record.” FREDDIE MAC, SUBPRIME LENDING (2008),
available at http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/citizenship/protecting_consumers/subprime.html.
Credit problems may be based on “sketchy credit or stretched finances.” Rich Brooks and Constance
Mitchell Ford, The United States of Subprime; Data Show Bad Loans Permeate the Nation; Pain Could
Last Years, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Oct. 11, 2007, at p. A1 (reporting that between 2004 and 2006 “more than
2,500 banks, thrifts, credit unions and mortgage companies made a combined $1.5 trillion in
high-interest-rate loans,” and that such loans were made, not only in “poorer communities,” but also in
“middle-class and wealthier communities”).
56. The Mortgage Bankers Association reported that foreclosures and late payments in the first quarter
of 2008 were at record levels. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSN., DELINQUENCIES AND FORECLOSURES INCREASE
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many renters—a segment of the housing market not generally included in
discussions of residential foreclosures—were directly affected by the crisis.57
Suddenly,58 renters were faced with losing their homes because the people
involved in the foreclosure process—defaulting owner-landlords, lenders and
foreclosure-sale purchasers—usually were not interested in the plight of affected
tenants.59 In some cases, particularly early in the foreclosure process, defaulting
landlords abandoned their building and stopped paying for utilities and other
services.60 In other cases, once the foreclosure process was completed,61 renters
IN LATEST MBA NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY, June 5, 2008, at p. 1, available at http://
www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/62936.htm. Subprime adjustable rate mortgages
(“ARMs”) accounted for 39 percent of new foreclosures, even though they made up only 6 percent of
outstanding loans. Id. Increases in mortgage payments (“resets”) of subprime ARMs peaked nationally in
June, 2008 at 7.61 percent of outstanding loans. Renae Merle, Resets Peaking on Subprime Loans, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2008, at p. D1. RealtyTrac®, a self-styled California “online foreclosure marketplace,”
reported in July 2008 that foreclosure filings on 739,714 properties during the second quarter in 2008
represented an increase of over 120 percent from the second quarter in 2007, and that “one in every 171
U.S. households received a foreclosure filing during the quarter,” with Nevada, California, Florida, Ohio,
Arizona, and Michigan leading the way. REALTYTRAC®, FORECLOSURE ACTIVITY UP 14 PERCENT IN
SECOND QUARTER (July 25, 2008), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/
pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID9&ItemID. Some estimate the total foreclosures in 2008 could be as high
as 2.5 million. Gretchen Morgenson, Big Rescues Can Work, Just Ask New York, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
2008, at BU 1; Zachary Gorchow, Foreclosure Crisis to Pinch Everyone, Mayors’ Report Says, DETROIT
FREE PRESS, Nov. 27, 2007, available at http://www.freep.com.
57. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. FOOTE, KRISTOPHER GERARDI, LORENZO GOETTE AND PAUL S. WILLEN,
SUBPRIME FACTS: WHAT (WE THINK) WE KNOW ABOUT THE SUBPRIME CRISIS AND WHAT WE DON’T 35
(May 30, 2008) (“An additional externality that often accompanies a multi-family foreclosure is the
eviction of tenants who rent apartments there”), available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2008/
ppdp0802.htm (last visited June 10, 2008); Rachel L. Swarns, supra note 43; New England Foreclosure
Study Estimates 45 Percent of Units in Four States are Renter-Occupied, HOUS. & DEV. RPTR, Vol. 36,
No. CD-10 [Current Dev.], May 19, 2008, at p. 297, reporting on study by the National Low Income
Housing Coalition (NLIHC); Jeni Senter, Renters Now Feel the Pinch of Foreclosure Pinch, SANTA ROSA
PRESS GAZETTE (Florida), May 23, 2008, available at http://www.srpressgazette.com; Hubble Smith,
Housing Slump: No Notice, No Home: More Renters Left Suddenly Homeless when Homeowners Don’t
Pay Mortgage, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-J., Mar. 16, 2008, available at http://www.reviewjournal.com;
Cynthia Osterman, Evicted US Tenants Go from Renter to Homeless Shelter, BRUNEI TIMES, Feb. 15,
2008, available at http://www.bt.com.bn/en/en/focus/2008/02/15evicted_us_tenants_go_from_renter_
to_homeless_shelter; Tamara E. Holmes, Foreclosure Can Leave Renters Homeless, BANKRATE.
COM, Nov. 9, 2007, available at http://www.bankrate.com; Steve Brandt and Warren Wolfe, Oct. 29:
Wave of Foreclosures Hits Renters, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 2007; Thelma
Gutierrez and Wayne Drash, Man Pays $30K in Rent, Faces Eviction, CNN, May 28, 2008, available
at http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/wayoflife/05/28/renters.booted/index.html.
58. See, e.g., Tim Logan, Renters Often Become the Forgotten Victims, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,
June 20, 2008, at p. B1 (reporting that lawyers with Legal Services of Eastern Missouri have clients who
first learn of the foreclosure process by receiving a notice of eviction following the foreclosure
proceedings).
59. Because mortgage loans usually will have priority over residential leases, the foreclosure process,
governed by state law, generally is not protective of residential renters, who tend to have short-term
leases.
60. Elizabeth A. Harris, Even Renters Aren’t Safe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/13/realestate/13cover.html (reporting renters being forced to leave
because of utility cut-offs); Osterman, supra note 57 (reporting that one tenant, a teacher, “endured
months with no lights or working toilets” after foreclosure against his landlord’s property).
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faced eviction because banks and/or foreclosure sale purchasers desired to start
fresh.62 While the foreclosure process affects homeowners and renters with all
levels of income,63 low-income renters “in many ways . . . are the most
vulnerable—and the least to blame when they get tossed out.”64
To make matters worse, the rise in foreclosures of owner-occupied properties
forced an increasing number of defaulting homeowners to seek rental housing in
a market with a “limited supply of affordable housing.”65 Many of these
homeowners, particularly in the minority and immigrant communities, previ-
ously had been “renter households with limited resources” who had been
“encouraged . . . to make the switch to home owning.”66 The losers in this
competition for rental housing, either the renters whose landlord-owners lost
control of their units through foreclosure, or the homeowners who could not
afford their mortgage payments, could well become homeless.67
A multi-year housing boom, driven by low interest rates and constantly
61. Foreclosure is governed by state law, which establishes a procedure to enable lenders to recover
property from defaulting borrowers through a public sale process. States authorize two different methods,
judicial foreclosure, see, e.g., 735 ILCS § 5/15-1501 et seq, in which the foreclosure process requires a
judicial hearing and power of sale foreclosure, see, e.g., RSMo §§ 443.290–443.410, in which a trustee
can offer mortgaged property to the highest bidder at a public sale after giving 20 days public notice.
RealtyTrac® organizes its reports of documents filed in foreclosure actions into three categories:
“Default – Notice of Default (NOD) and Lis Pendens (LIS); Auction – Notice of Trustee Sale and Notice
of Foreclosure Sale (NTS and NFS); and Real Estate Owned, or REO properties (that have been
foreclosed upon and repurchased by a bank).” RealtyTrac®, supra note 56, at 2.
62. Senter, supra note 57 (quoting commercial real estate attorney in Seattle that residential leases
“rarely” contain agreements with lenders giving tenants priority rights enabling them to remain in
possession after foreclosure).
63. Retired television personality Ed McMahon, 85, faced foreclosure on his multi-million dollar
Beverly Hills estate. Mireya Navarro, Ed McMahon’s 90210 Mortgage Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008,
at ST 2; James R. Hagerty and Glenn R. Simpson, Ed McMahon May Lose Beverly Hills Home, WALL ST.
J., June 4, 2008, at A3. See also Gutierrez and Drash, supra note 57 (reporting that an owner of an auto
sales company paying over $4000/month rent in an upper-middle class “enclave” and a single mother on
fixed income both were threatened with loss of their homes through foreclosures against their landlords).
64. Comments of Rev. John Estrem, CEO of Catholic Charities, Minneapolis-St. Paul, as reported by
Brandt and Wolfe, supra note 57.
65. HARV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, AMERICA’S RENTAL HOUSING: THE KEY TO A BALANCED
NATIONAL POLICY 2 (2008).
66. Id. at 5-6. In 2002, President George W. Bush announced an ambitious goal of increasing
homeownership opportunities for low-income households. PRES. GEORGE W. BUSH, A HOME OF YOUR
OWN: EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL AMERICANS (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
infocus/homeownership/homeownership-policy-bookwhole.pdf. See also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB.
DEV., BLUEPRINT FOR THE AMERICAN DREAM (2002), available at http://www.hud.gov/news/releasedocs/
blueprint.pdf. See Paulette Williams, The Continuing Crisis in Affordable Housing: Systemic Issues
Requiring Systemic Solutions, FORDHAM URB. L. J. 413 (2004) for a generally supportive analysis of
homeownership initiatives.
67. BOB ERLENBUSCH, KELLY O’CONNOR, SHERRIE DOWNING & SUE WATLOV PHILLIPS, FORECLOSURE
TO HOMELESSNESS: THE FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 4 (2008) (“Nearly forgotten in this
crisis are the thousands of homeowners and renters who have become homeless once their equity is
exhausted”); Manny Fernandez, The Neediest Cases: Helping to Keep Homelessness at Bay as
Foreclosures Hit More Families, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
02/04/nyregion/04neediest.html.
No. 1] 21National Affordable Housing Trust Fund
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1444383
increasing housing prices, peaked in 2005.68 Many of the loans fueling this boom
were secured by non-traditional means such as subprime adjustable rate
mortgages (“ARM”), which begin with low “teaser” rates for a year or two, but
then adjust upwards by one or more points on a regular basis, until reaching a
peak several points above the initial rate.69 Defaults leading to foreclosures began
occurring in significant numbers when borrowers could not afford the new
monthly payments triggered by the higher interest rates.70 The problem, serious
in late 2006 and early 2007,71 then ballooned into a crisis in 2008, causing the
Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve to take emergency steps72 to
protect Fannie Mae73 and Freddie Mac,74 also known as Government-Sponsored
Enterprises (“GSEs”),75 who between them “own or guarantee about half of the
country’s $12 trillion in mortgage debt.”76
During that time, Congress and the Bush Administration struggled to reach
68. HARV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 2008, supra note
54, at 6, 17 (“price appreciation showed signs of weakening in 2005,” “the homeownership rate began to
retreat in 2005 and 2006 and then dropped more steeply in 2007”); Alec Klein and Zachary A. Goldfarb,
The Bubble: How Homeowners, Speculators and Wall Street Dealmakers Rode a Wave of Easy Money
with Crippling Consequences, WASH. POST, June 15, 2008, at p. A1 (quoting a loan officer about a lavish
party hosted by a mortgage company in December, 2005: “It was the peak. It was the embodiment of
business success.”).
69. A mortgage loan is said to be non-traditional if it is underwritten less carefully than the norm, e.g.,
incomplete verification of income or employment status, or if it has features different from a standard
fixed-rate, self-amortizing loan, a “fixed-rate, short-term mortgage with a balloon payment, or a “simple”
ARM, defined as one “having a set of rules that determine the interest rate used to calculate every
payment based on an index, a margin, an agreed-upon frequency of adjustment, a per-period cap, and a
lifetime cap.” FREDERICK J. EGGERS AND DONALD BRADLEY, THE AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY AND
NON-TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE PRODUCTS 10-11 (2007).
70. See infra notes 131-145 and accompanying text.
71. ELLEN SCHLOEMER, WEI LI, KEITH ERNST & KATHLEEN KEEST, LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN
THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 11-22 (Center for Responsible Lending, Dec.
2006 (estimating that “2.2 million U.S. households [who entered into subprime mortgage loan
transactions between 1998 and 2006] will lose their home to foreclosure” and that “one in five” subprime
loans originating in 2005 and 2006 will foreclose)); Brooks and Ford, supra note 55 (“As America’s
mortgage markets began unraveling this year [2007]”).
72. Stephen Labaton, Treasury Unveils Vast Plan to Save Mortgage Giants, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2008,
at p. A1; Neil Irwin and Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, U.S. Unveils Plan to Aid Mortgage Giants, WASH. POST,
July 14, 2008, at p. A1.
73. Fannie Mae was authorized to purchase qualified residential mortgage loans from originating
lending institutions by the National Housing Act Amendments of 1938, Pub. L. No. 424, 52 Stat. 8, 23, 24
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 et seq. (2006)).
74. Freddie Mac received similar authorization by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act
of 1970, Title III, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 451 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449
(2006)).
75. The term, Government-Sponsored Enterprise, was coined to denote the fact that the two agencies
are corporations chartered by the federal government but owned by private investors who hold stock in
the entities.
76. Julie Creswell, Long Protected by Washington, Fannie and Freddie Ballooned, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 2008, at p. A1.
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agreement on an appropriate response. Numerous bills were filed and debated77
and several program initiatives were announced by Federal agencies.78 But
achieving consensus on a program that would “rescue the needy but not the
reckless or greedy” proved to be very difficult.79
Not surprisingly, most of the attention of policy makers and analysts has been
on the impact the subprime mortgage crisis has had on millions of American
homeowners and their communities, as well as its effect on financial markets and
the overall economy.80 But it also has exacerbated the housing problems of
low-income renters. One side effect of the sharp increase in residential mortgage
foreclosures is additional pressure on residential rental markets, with low-income
households facing both increased competition for rental units from previous
homeowners who have lost their homes through foreclosure81 and eviction from
current rental units (or loss of services such as heat and water) because of
77. See e.g., H.R. 3221 (comprehensive mortgage foreclosure relief authorizing $300 billion in
refinancing loans by FHA), passed by the House on May 8, 2008, and incorporating H.R. 1427
(government sponsored enterprise (“GSE”) reform), H.R. 1852 (FHA modernization), portions of H.R.
5720 relating to the low-income housing tax credit and tax-exempt housing bonds, as well as H.R. 5579
(encouraging workout plans or loan modifications in certain circumstances) and H.R. 5830 (FHA
refinancing); H.R. 5818, also passed by the House on May 8 ($15 billion in loans and grants to states and
localities for acquisition and renovation of vacant homes whose mortgages have been foreclosed); S.
2523 (National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act). The House-passed legislation is discussed in Barry
G. Jacobs, House Passes Comprehensive Mortgage Foreclosure Relief Bill, HOUS. & DEV. RPTR, supra
note 57, at 290.
78. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery & David Cho, Bush Readies Mortgage Aid Plan, WASH. POST, Mar.
29, 2008, at p. A1. See also, Fannie Mae Launches Initiatives To Address Mortgage Problems, HOUS. &
DEV. RPTR, supra note 57, at 309; HOPE NOW Alliance Reports Progress in Helping Homeowners
Struggling with Mortgage Problems, Id. Feb. 4, 2008, at 81. Two pieces of legislation were enacted in late
2007 and early 2008: the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-142, 121 Stat.
1803, codified at 26 U.S.C. § 108, eliminating tax liability for people who sell their homes for less than
they owe (“short sales”) and temporary increase of loan limits for mortgages eligible to be purchased by
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from $417,000 to $730,000 contained in the economic stimulus package,
Section 201, Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-185, 122 Stat 613, 619-621 (for mortgages
originated between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2008).
79. David M. Herszenhorn and Vikas Bajaj, The Tricky Task Of Offering Aid To Homeowners, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, at pp. A1, A17. One study concluded that “[a]s much as 70 percent of recent early
payment defaults had fraudulent misrepresentations on their original loan applications.” Tyler Cowen, So
We Thought, But Then Again . . . , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, at BU 6 (discussing a study of more than
three million loans between 1997 and 2006, OCCUPANCY FRAUD AND THE IMPACT TO THE MORTGAGE
INDUSTRY (2008) by BasePoint Analytics, a lender consulting firm). The opening of Senate debate on a
Banking Committee compromise bill, discussed infra, was met with the threat of a Presidential veto. Lori
Montgomery, Veto Threatened for Housing Bill: White House Objects to Funding Plan for FHA
Program, WASH. POST, June 20, 2008, at p. D2.
80. The foreclosure crisis has been called “[t]he collapse of the bubble in the U. S. housing market,”
DEAN BAKER, DANILO PELLETIERE AND HYE JIN RHO, THE COST OF MAINTAINING OWNERSHIP IN THE
CURRENT CRISIS 2 (2008), a “financial time bomb,” Nelson D. Schwartz and Vikas Bajaj, Credit Time
Bomb Ticked, But Few Heard, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2007, at A1, and a “tsunami of predatory lenders
preying on the unsuspecting, the misinformed and the overeager,” Tim McKenzie, The Case for Plan B,
SHELTERFORCE, Fall 2007, at 36, 37.
81. HARVARD JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra note 65.
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foreclosure actions taken against their landlords.82
Massive foreclosures of mortgages on both single-family and multi-family
residences in turn threaten many neighborhoods, particularly those with high
concentrations of low-income and/or minority households.83 As a Brookings
Institute report noted, local real estate markets, particularly in middle- and
upper-income neighborhoods, usually can absorb an occasional foreclosure. But
“market demand is insufficient to absorb” large scale foreclosures in lower-
income neighborhoods, often resulting in abandonment or purchase and “flip-
ping” by a speculator.84 Abandoned houses and apartments can have a deleterious
effect on property values of neighboring units, and can become fire hazards and
sources for criminal activity.85
B. Effect of Changes in Traditional Residential Mortgage Practice
The subprime mortgage/foreclosure crisis is the product of a number of
factors, including a breakdown in the loan/investment analysis process86 and
sharp increases in the cost of housing.87 But three changes in traditional
82. For reports of this phenomenon, see Harris, supra note 60; Jeni Senter, Renters Now Feel the
Pinch of Foreclosure Pinch, SANTA ROSA PRESS GAZETTE (Florida), May 23, 2008, available at
http://www.srpressgazette.com; Tamara E. Holmes, Foreclosure Can Leave Renters Homeless, BANKRATE.
COM, Nov. 9, 2007, available at http://www.bankrate.com; Steve Brandt and Warren Wolfe, Oct. 29:
Wave of Foreclosures Hits Renters, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.startribune.com/business/11245186.html; Thelma Gutierrex and Wayne Drash, Man Pays
$30K in Rent, Faces Eviction, CNN, May 28, 2008, available at http://www.cnn.com/2008/LIVING/
wayoflife/05/28/renters.booted/index.html. See also ERLENBUSCH ET AL., supra note 67 (expressing
concern that large numbers of homeowners and renters face danger of becoming homeless because of
foreclosure).
83. See, e.g., Keith E. Wardrip & Danilo Pelletiere, Neighborhood Poverty and Tenure Characteristics
and the Incidence of Foreclosures in New England 3 (June 17, 2008) (Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal.,
Research Note #08-02, June 17, 2008), available at www.nlihc.org/doc/RN-08-02-Final.pdf (“The real
foreclosure ‘hot spots’ are neighborhoods with high levels of poverty and average-to-high levels of
renter-occupied housing”); REBUILD OHIO AND COMMUNITY RESEARCH PARTNERS, $60 MILLION AND
COUNTING: THE COST OF VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES TO EIGHT OHIO CITIES (2008), available at
www.greaterohio.org/rebuildohio/ROPolicyrecsfinal_nonembargoed.pdf; Neighborhoods Bear the Brunt,
WASH. POST, June 30, 2008, at A2 (reporting that a study of subprime mortgages in New York City by the
NYU Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy found that the 10 neighborhoods with the highest
incidence of subprime mortgages – nearly half of the mortgages issued in those neighborhoods – were
predominantly minority neighborhoods).
84. ALAN MALLACH, TACKLING THE MORTGAGE CRISIS: 10 ACTION STEPS FOR STATE GOVERNMENT 6
(2008).
85. Id. (citing studies from Philadelphia and cities in Ohio). See also WILLIAM C. APGAR and MARK
DUDA, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF TODAY’S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BOOM
(2005), prepared for the Homeownership Preservation Foundation, www.hpfonline.org (documenting
costs to municipalities from foreclosures, using Chicago as an example, that can exceed $30,000 per
property).
86. Schwartz & Bajaj, supra note 80.
87. In a comparison of the costs of owning and renting in 20 metropolitan areas, researchers for the
Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) and NLIHC found that, while ownership and rental
costs were roughly in balance in several cities such as Atlanta, Cleveland, Detroit and Houston, coastal
24 [Vol. XVIThe Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1444383
residential mortgage practice stand out as influencing, if not causing, the crisis: 1)
greater use of alternative mortgage instruments such as adjustable rate mort-
gages,88 2) the securitization of mortgages89 and 3) a willingness to lend to
persons with poor credit (the “subprime” market).90
1. Alternative Mortgage Instruments
The ability of the majority of American families to become homeowners was
made possible in great part by the development of a “standard” residential note
and mortgage in which the essential terms (interest rate, down payment amount,
monthly payment, length of the note and mortgage) were fixed at the beginning of
the relationship between borrower and lender and remained so for the duration of
the loan.91 This relationship, called a “level payment, self-amortizing” loan,92
was made possible by the Depression-era creation of the federal mortgage
insurance program administered by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”)
in 193493 and the establishment of a secondary mortgage market by Fannie Mae
in 1938,94 the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) in
196895 and Freddie Mac in 1970.96 These federal initiatives had major influences
cities such as Boston, Los Angeles, New York, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and Washington, D.C.,
ownership costs were double or close to triple rental costs. BAKER ET AL., supra note 80, at 4.
88. For a discussion of the development of alternative mortgage instruments, see Helen Jean Walleser,
Balancing the Interest: The Changing Complexion of Home Mortgage Financing in America, 31
DRAKE. L. REV. 1 (1981); Stanley L. Iezman, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: Their Effect on
Residential Financing, 10 REAL EST. L. J. 3 (1981); Douglas W. Kmiec, Shared Appreciation Mortgages:
A Step Toward Making Housing a Bad Investment, 10 REAL EST. L. J. 302 (1982); Stephen Cowen &
Susan E. Foley, New Trends in Residential Mortgage Finance, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1075 (1978).
89. Mortgage securitization is discussed in Michael Schill, The Impact of the Capital Markets on Real
Estate Law and Practice, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 269-79 (1999), and Robin Malloy, The Secondary
Mortgage Market – A Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 991,
1003-1010 (1986).
90. See generally Allen Fishbein & Harold Bunce, Subprime Market Growth and Predatory Lending:
Housing Policy in the New Millennium, in HOUSING POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 273 (Susan M.
Watcher & R. Leo Penne eds., 2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/brd/
13Fishbein.pdf.
91. For a discussion of this “credit quartet,” see CURTIS J. BERGER and QUINTIN JOHNSTONE, LAND
TRANSFER AND FINANCE 177-228 (4th ed. 1993).
92. Id. at 226-27.
93. FHA was created by and received its authority from the National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.
73-479, 48 Stat. 1246 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1701-50 (2003)).
94. Fannie Mae was authorized to purchase federally-insured residential mortgages from banks and
savings and loan associations and to resell them to other investors by the National Housing Act
Amendments of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-424, 52 Stat. 8 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (2003)).
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”), established by Congress in 1935 to help the country
work itself out of the Depression, developed a successful program to purchase FHA-insured, and later
VA-guaranteed, mortgages. This program demonstrated that a secondary market for residential
mortgages was feasible. Malloy, supra note 89, at 992-93.
95. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, Title VIII, § 801, 82 Stat. 536
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716b (2003)). Ginnie Mae was organized as a government agency, rather than a
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on homeownership and the growth of suburbia after World War II.97
The standard or “traditional” mortgage instrument “is a long-term asset with
both a fixed principal and interest rate.”98 It “was designed to function in a
non-inflationary economy”99 and did so quite well until the inflationary decade of
the 1970s. During the 1970s and 1980s, double digit inflation caused serious
problems for residential mortgage lenders as well as borrowers.100 Because the
standard mortgage instrument featured a fixed interest rate and a lengthy term (20
to 30 years), mortgage lenders found themselves locked into mortgages with
relatively low, single digit interest rates at a time when they had to pay double
digit rates to obtain additional funds for making additional loans.101 Lenders
responded by charging much higher interest rates for new or refinanced loans.102
Many potential home buyers, particularly first-time buyers, were put off by the
resulting high interest rates. Young professionals and other upwardly mobile
persons could look forward to increases in income as they acquired experience
and skills, but had increasing difficulty affording the high monthly payments
demanded by double digit interest rates in the early stages of their careers.103
In response to these pressures, a number of “convenience-related” and
“inflation-related” alternative mortgage instruments were developed.104 “Conve-
nience-related” mortgage products, such as the graduated payment mortgage
government-sponsored enterprise like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to buy federally-subsidized loans
such as those authorized by the 235 and 236 programs. Id. at §§ 1720-21.
96. Freddie Mac was created and given similar authority to purchase and sell conventional loans by
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, Title III, 84 Stat. 451
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (2003)).
97. Christopher Leinberger argues that the “suburban dream began . . . at the New York World’s Fair
of 1939 and ’40,” where “perhaps 10 percent of the American population” saw the exhibit, “‘Highways
and Horizons,’ better known as ‘Futurama’” that featured “a scale model, covering an area about the size
of a football field, that showed what American cities and towns might look like in 1960.” Christopher B.
Leinberger, The Next Slum? THE ATLANTIC, Mar. 2008, at 70, 71.
98. Walleser, supra note 88, at 3.
99. Id. (citing Donald M. Kaplan, The Alternative Mortgage Instruments Research Study: A Progress
Report, 9 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. J. 6, 8 (Oct. 1976)).
100. Iezman, supra note 88, at 3 (reporting mortgage interest rates in 1981 in the 14-15% range).
101. A bank president explained the lender’s dilemma to a law school real estate development class by
likening the lender to a seller of shoes, the only difference being the product the lender was selling
(money). The shoe vendor has to buy the shoes she sells from a shoe manufacturer, and the lender has to
buy the money she lends from other financial institutions and investors. If she has to pay more for new
money than she is receiving from outstanding loans, she will not be able to continue lending for very
long. Because it is very difficult to forecast what the cost of money will be in five years, let alone 20 or 30
years, lenders have strong incentives to move away from long-term fixed interest rate loans. Comments
of John Dubinsky, Saint Louis University School of Law, Feb. 1976.
102. The author recalls accepting a second mortgage loan in 1981 with an interest rate of 20% to pay
for education and home improvement expenses rather than refinancing his first mortgage at 15-16% in the
hopes that rates would drop soon. Fortunately they did the following year and refinancing became
feasible.
103. See, e.g., Glenn H. Miller, The Affordability of Home Ownership in the 1970s, ECONOMIC
REVIEW, Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 17, available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/PUBLICATE/ECONREV/
EconRevArchive/1980/3-4q80mill.pdf.
104. Walleser, supra note 88, at 7.
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(GPM), featuring lower monthly payments initially and increases later, and the
combination GPM/variable rate mortgage (VRM), in which both monthly
payments and interest rates are lower initially but increase later, were designed
for the “convenience” of the borrower who could anticipate regular increases in
income. “Inflation-related” products, such as the adjustable rate mortgage
(ARM), in which the interest rate will “adjust” periodically as an index to which
it is linked, were designed to shift to the buyer the risk that interest rates will
increase.105 After several years of product testing and resolving a number of
regulatory issues, including questions of authority to make such loans106 and
whether interest rate increases would violate state usury laws,107 ARMs became
popular means of financing residential transactions, particularly for families
buying their first home.108 They became a fixture in the subprime mortgage
market, making up a large share of the so-called “nontraditional mortgage
market.”109
2. Mortgage Securitization
A second change in the traditional residential mortgage market that had a
profound influence on the subprime mortgage/foreclosure crisis was the growth
of the concept of mortgage securitization. The growth of the secondary mortgage
market in the 1970s prompted interest in mortgage securitization, defined by
David Richards, former chair of the American Bar Association’s Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law, as
the financing of real estate through the nontraditional methods of stocks and
bonds—known collectively as “mortgage-backed securities” (“MBS”)—in
order to expand the available lending community and to use more efficient
(cheaper) primary and secondary capital sources.110
105. Id. at 7-8.
106. Cowan and Foley, supra note 88, at 1077 (citing KAPLAN, ed., THE ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE
INSTRUMENTS RESEARCH STUDY (AMIRS), FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK BOARD (1977)).
107. Id. at 1082.
108. Walleser, supra note 88, at 18, describes the potential ARM market as follows:
The hypothetical family an ARM would most attract . . . would have a present income
disproportionately lower than their anticipated future income. For example, one family wage
earner might be outside the labor force for educational reasons or because he had chosen to
remain home with young children. Such a family could expect a rise in earning capacity that
would offset future interest increases.
109. “Traditional” mortgages, also known as “level payment” mortgages, are structured so that the
monthly payment remains the same for the life of the loan. But in a nontraditional mortgage, “the
borrower faces two payment regimes: an initial regime with low payments and a second regime where
payments increase to fully amortize the loan and to compensate the lender for the cost of capital and
riskiness of the loan.” Subprime Mortgage Woes May Spur Changes in AHS Data, RESEARCH WORKS,
Mar. 2008, at 4 (quoting Inside Mortgage Finance).
110. David Alan Richards, “Gradable and Tradable”: The Securitization of Commercial Real Estate
Mortgages, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 99, 99 (1987).
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Once Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac received authorization to purchase conven-
tional loans, Fannie in 1968111 and Freddie in 1970,112 the secondary mortgage
market business picked up considerably.113 As volume increased, a “let me have a
piece of the Rock”114 mentality took hold and mortgage securitization was
born.115
Mortgage securitization was a logical extension of legendary land developer
William Zeckendorf’s “Hawaiian Technique,”116 by which he created a variety of
opportunities for investment in real estate through the sale of fractional interests
in real estate ventures such as leases, sub-leases and sub-sub-leases, to which he
attached mortgages. In this way, he could offer investment opportunities to
multiple parties who would obtain property interests, such as a ground lease, a
mortgage on the ground lease, a building sub-lease, a mortgage on that interest, a
space sub-sub-lease and a mortgage on that interest. The resulting investment
risks approximated the investment risks of debentures, preferred stock and
common stock, depending on where purchasers’ interests put them in line to
receive fruits of the venture.117
Residential mortgage securitization applies the same concept of fractional
property interests to residential mortgages which have been accumulated by an
intermediary into packages or pools of 100, 1000, or 10,000 mortgages from all
over the country. The mortgage pools are sold to investment entities or GSEs,
who finance the purchase of these pools by selling “mortgage-backed securities,”
which are “slices” (fractional shares) of a pool that are backed by mortgages in
the pool.118 Michael Schill summarizes the development of mortgage-backed
securities:
The first generation of mortgage-backed securities were pass-through certifi-
cates that entitled the holders to a proportionate share of interest and principal
as these amounts were paid by mortgagors. Recognizing that investors have
111. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, Title VIII, § 801, 82 Stat. 536
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716b (2003)).
112. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, Title III, 84 Stat.
451 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (2003)).
113. See generally Malloy, supra note 89.
114. A legendary television commercial by Prudential Insurance Company used the Rock of
Gibraulter as a symbol of the company’s stability and value and offered prospective customers a “piece of
the Rock.” A Google search produced over 8000 references to the phrase, including a comment by U.S.
Rep. Thomas Reynolds (R-N.Y.) that homeownership “gives people an opportunity to build equity – to
own a piece of the rock.” Ben Rand, HUD Secretary Visits Greece Homeowner, ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT
AND CHRONICLE, June 13, 2006, available at www.housingchoice.org/news%20stories/2006/06132006.htm
(last visited July 31, 2008).
115. Richards, supra note 110, at 102 (mortgage securitization was “invented in 1970”).
116. William Zeckendorf named his idea the Hawaiian Technique because it came to him while he was
surf fishing during a vacation in Hawaii. WILLIAM ZECKENDORF with EDWARD MCCREARY, ZECKENDORF
144-148 (1970).
117. Id.
118. Richards, supra note 110, at 102.
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varying time horizons and tolerances for risk, issuers of mortgage-backed
securities subsequently divided the flow of mortgage interest and principal
from the pool to create debt instruments of varying maturities and levels of risk.
These mortgage-backed securities were initially structured as collateralized
mortgage obligations and then, after the Tax Reform Act of 1968, as Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduits or REMICS.119
Once the idea of securitization caught on, residential mortgage-backed securities
enjoyed “phenomenal” growth.120 Schill reports that by 1984, “the three
secondary mortgage market agencies together issued $58.6 billion in pass-
through securities backed by one-to-four family home conventional mort-
gages.”121 Less than ten years later, in 1993, the figure had climbed to a $550
billion peak and by 1997, the agencies’ origination of $358.3 billion “consti-
tute[ed] more than a 500% increase over the thirteen year period.”122 The Center
for Responsible Lending reported that by June 30, 2006, “mortgage-backed
securities were the largest segment of the United States bond market, accounting
for 23 percent of all bond market debt outstanding.”123 By 2007, “mortgage-
related debt” was the “largest segment of the U.S. bond market.”124
As securitization grew in size and complexity, and more actors got involved,
the traditional protections—solid appraisals of property, close analysis of
borrowers’ income and ability to pay back the amount of principle and interest to
which they were committing, and extent of borrowers’ commitment to the
transaction, as measured by the amount of their investment in the property—
tended to be forgotten. A mentality developed that “someone else”—the
appraiser, the lender, the government—was minding the store, when in fact no
one was in many cases, particularly in the subprime field.125




123. Corporate bonds accounted for 20 percent and Treasury debt 16 percent of the market.
SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 71, at 29 (citing U.S. Bond Market Debt, Bond Market Association (June
30, 2006)), available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/assets/files/Outstanding%20Level.pdf.
124. PIMCO, Bond Basics: Mortgage-Backed Securities 3 (October 2007), http://www.pimco.com/
LeftNav/BondResources/Default.htm (last visited July 31, 2008).
125. Michael M. Grynbaum, Study Finds Flawed Practices at Ratings Firms, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2008, at C1 (reporting that the Securities and Exchange Commission had concluded that major ratings
firms “flouted conflict of interest guidelines and considered their own profits when rating securities”);
Charlie Savage, Government Crackdown on Mortgage Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/business/20mortgage.html (reporting that a Justice Department
sweep, Operation Malicious Mortgage, had resulted in the indictment of over 400 people on charges of
mortgage fraud); Aaron Luchetti, Bond-Rating Shifts Loom in Settlement: N.Y.’s Cuomo Plans Overhaul
of How Firms Get Paid, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2008, at C1(reporting tentative settlement of concerns about
ratings of mortgage-related securities); Ruth Simon, Investors Press Lenders on Bad Loans, WALL ST. J.,
May 28, 2008, at C1; Vikas Bajaj, Inquiry Assails Accounting Firm in Lender’s Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2008, at A1; Vikas Bajaj, In Deal With Cuomo, Mortgage Giants Accept Appraisal Standards, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/business/04loans.html?refus.;
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One response to the collapse of the subprime mortgage-backed securities
market is a European-favored alternative financing mechanism called a “covered
bond.”126 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) defines a
covered bond as “a recourse debt obligation of an insured depository institution
(“IDI”) with a (one- to ten-year) term that is secured directly or indirectly by a
pool of mortgage loans or AAA-rated mortgage bonds.”127 The European
Covered Bond Council (“ECBC”) traces covered bonds to the Greek mortgage
and Italian and Dutch bonds, with major developments occurring in the 18th and
19th centuries; by 2007 twenty-seven countries had legislation or contracts
authorizing issuance of covered bonds.128
Common characteristics of covered bonds include 1) issuance by financial
institutions “subject to public supervision and regulation,” 2) a “cover pool of
financial assets” to which bondholders have a priority claim, 3) a continuing
obligation of issuers to “maintain sufficient assets in the cover pool,” and 4)
public or independent body supervision of issuer obligations.129 Although similar
to mortgage-backed securities, covered bonds are believed to provide greater
protection because “they stay on a bank’s balance sheet and the buyer of the
bonds gets double protection:” 1) a “‘cover pool’” of mortgages meeting stricter
standards, and 2) a commitment by the issuing bank to “step in to ensure bond
holders get their interest” if mortgages default.130
3. The Subprime Market
The subprime mortgage market consists of borrowers who are perceived to
have a higher-risk of default or difficulty in making payments than borrowers in
the “lowest-risk or prime” category.131 A Wall Street Journal analysis of over 130
million home loans made during the 1996-2006 period “reveal[ed] that risky
mortgages were made in nearly every corner of the nation, from small towns in
the middle of nowhere to inner cities to affluent suburbs.”132 The article identified
three groups of subprime borrowers: 1) “investors hoping to strike it rich by
Christopher Maag, Cleveland Sues 21 Lenders Over Subprime Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008,
available at http:www/nytimes.com/2008/01/12/us/12cleveland.html? (alleging that public nuisances
resulted from widespread abandonment of homes facing foreclosure).
126. Deborah Solomon, U.S. Pushes a European Method to Help Banks Make Home Loans, WALL ST.
J., June 17, 2008, at p. A3.
127. FDIC, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION LETTER, FIL-34-2008, Apr. 30, 2008, available at http://
www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2008/fil08034.pdf.
128. EUROPEAN COVERED BOND COUNCIL, EUROPEAN COVERED BOND FACTBOOK 67-70 (2007).
129. Id. at 73.
130. Solomon, supra note 126. On July 28, 2008, the Treasury Department released what it termed
“best practices” for banks to invest in covered bonds. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BEST PRACTICES
FOR RESIDENTIAL COVERED BONDS (July 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/
covered-bonds/.
131. AMY CREW CUTTS AND ROBERT VAN ORDER, On The Economics of Subprime Lending 10 (Freddie
Mac Working Paper #04-01, Jan. 2004).
132. Brooks & Ford, supra note 55.
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speculating on condominiums,” 2) “six-figure income” home buyers responding
to “sky-high housing costs” and 3) “lower-income consumers with spotty
credit.”133 All were accommodated by “an aggressive home-mortgage industry
trying to get people into homes they couldn’t afford at a time when home prices
were very high.”134
A study of the economics of subprime lending by Freddie Mac in 2004, before
the subprime crisis began, identified six main “stylized facts” of the subprime
market:
1. High interest rates.
2. High points and fees.
3. Prevalence of prepayment penalties.
4. Lending based largely on asset value, rather than borrower characteristics,
with low loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and high rejection rates.
5. Specialized subprime lenders who cater only to subprime borrowers and
who have limited access to secondary mortgage markets.
6. Large rate differences between marginally prime and marginally subprime
borrowers.135
A HUD-sponsored study of the mortgage finance component136 of the American
Housing Survey (“AHS”)137 distinguished subprime mortgages from non-
traditional mortgages, arguing that “subprime” is best reserved for mortgages that
present higher risk either because of reduced underwriting, unusual features, or
the lower credit worthiness of the borrowers.”138
Popular non-traditional mortgages, that may or may not also be subprime
mortgages, include interest-only mortgages, with lower payments for a few years
and higher payments for the balance of the loan term, hybrid ARMs, featuring a
fixed, below-market interest for the first period, then an ARM with higher rates to
compensate for the original below-market interest rate, and option ARMs,
containing “three distinguishing features”:
an initial, below-market interest rate (a buydown); a provision that allows the
borrower to determine what payment to make each month (the option); and the
ability to add to the outstanding balance by making a payment less than the
133. Id.
134. Id. (quoting Karl Case, an economics professor at Wellesley College).
135. Cutts and Order, supra note 131, at 1-2.
136. Eggers and Bradley, supra note 69.
137. The AHS is a “biennial record of the physical characteristics, quality, and condition of the
nation’s housing stock and of the characteristics of the households in occupied housing units,” paid for by
HUD and conducted by the Census Bureau. Id. at 1.
138. Id. at 11.
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amount of the accrued interest (negative amortization). After some initial
period, the loan becomes a fully amortizing ARM.139
The “distinguishing feature” of these types of loans is the fact that borrowers
“face two payment regimes: an initial regime with low payments and a second
regime where payments increase,” often quite sharply.140 For example, a 30-year,
$100,000 loan with an initial interest rate of 6% for two years and a second
interest rate of 8% would have initial monthly payments of approximately $600
per month. A first-time home buyer who qualified for that loan under the
conventional standard of 25-30% of income would have an income in the range
of $24,000 to $30,000 per year. When the interest rate reset (changed) to 8% two
years later, the monthly payment would increase to approximately $730 per
month, requiring an income range between $29,000 and $35,000 per year for the
loan to remain affordable. The resulting “sticker shock” was too much for many
borrowers, and helped fuel the subprime mortgage foreclosure crisis.141
Very few borrowers could expect their income to rise by 20% in two years, but
HUD and the GSEs looked the other way. In the interest of expanding home
ownership to lower income and minority households, HUD continued a practice
mandated by Congress in 1992142 of establishing annual affordable housing goals
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to include in their portfolios a percentage of
“affordable” mortgage loans to “meet the then-existing unaddressed needs” of
low-income and very low-income families.143 As the subprime market expanded,
the GSEs increased their purchases of subprime mortgage-backed securities to a
total of $434 billion in the three-year period, 2004 to 2006.144 Former HUD
officials have concluded that the policy of counting subprime loans as “afford-
able” in order to foster homeownership goals was “a mistake.”145
139. Id. at 11-12.
140. Id. at 12.
141. In some particularly hard-hit areas, the sharp rise in foreclosures spawned new businesses, such
as You Walk Away Services of San Diego, which opened in January 2008 and in less than two months had
more than 200 clients in six states. “For $995, [You Walk Away Services] helps people walk away from
their homes, ceding them to the banks in foreclosure.” John Leland, Facing Default, Some Walk Out on
New Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/29us/
29walks.html.
142. The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, Subpart B, Pub. L.
102-550, §§ 1331-1338, 106 Stat. 3956-3964, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4561-67, established the goal
requirements and directed the Secretary of HUD to promulgate them, along with annual reporting
requirements.
143. 12 U.S.C. § 4563. Goals for 2005-2008 increasing the percentage of affordable unit mortgages in
the GSEs’ portfolios from 52% to 56% of their total portfolios were published in 24 CFR Subtitle B,
§§ 81.12–81.22 (Apr. 1, 2005 Ed.). FANNIE MAE’S 2007 ANNUAL HOUSING ACTIVITIES REPORT (Mar. 17,
2008), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/gse/gse.cfm.
144. Carol D. Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed The Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at p.
A1.
145. Id. (quoting William C. Apgar, Jr., a HUD assistant secretary in the Clinton Administration, and
Allen Fishbein, his advisor during that period).
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III. HOUSING FINANCE REGULATORY REFORM AND THE NEW AFORDABLE
HOUSING TRUST FUND
As noted earlier,146 Congress and the Bush Administration struggled through-
out 2007 and much of 2008 to determine an appropriate Federal response to the
foreclosure crisis. Economists and other commentators warned against too much
government intervention,147 while legislators and advocates debated alternative
proposals.148 The failure of IndyMac Bancorp, one of the largest such failures in
U.S. history,149 and the sharp erosion of confidence in Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac150 that occurred in July 2008 gave a final push to Congressional and
Administration efforts to craft a suitable response. The new Housing Trust Fund
program was included in that response.
A. Regulatory Reform and Foreclosure Prevention
1. A New Regulatory Agency
The main thrust of regulatory reform efforts is the replacement of HUD’s
supervisory authority over the GSEs with that of a new independent agency, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), with supervisory authority over
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks and the Office of
Finance.151 The Director of FHFA’s
146. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
147. See e.g., David Nicklaus, Congressional Help Could Be Ruin of Fannie and Freddie, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 13, 2008, at B1 (echoing concern of some economists that Congressional expansion
of mortgage loan purchase limits for Freddie Mae and Freddie Mac from $417,000 to $730,000 “went too
far”). See supra note 79.
148. See e.g., Edmund Andrews, In Washington, Aid to Homeowners Debated, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/28/business/28workout.html (reporting that the
Bush administration was “reluctant to bail out” undeserving borrowers and Democrats sought to “help
lower-income people renegotiate their loans and stay in their homes”); Foreclosure Crisis May Create
Opportunity to Boost Funding for HUD Programs, Ramirez Says, HOUS. & DEV. RPTR CD-8, Apr. 21,
2008, at 230; Response to Housing Crisis Must Consider Relationship of Local Ownership, Rental Costs,
Study Says, HOUS. & DEV. RPTR No. CD-8, Apr. 21, 2008, at 233.
149. Louise Story, Regulators Seize Mortgage Lender, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/business/12indymac.html?refbusiness&pagewantedprint.
150. Stephen Labaton, Scramble Led to Rescue Plan on Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/washington/15fannie.html?pagewantedprint.
151. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654, at § 1101 et
seq. Less than six weeks after the legislation creating FHFA was enacted, its director, James Lockhart,
announced that FHFA had placed Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship, which he described as “a
statutory process [12 U.S.C. § 4619] designed to stabilize a troubled institution with the objective of
returning the entities to normal business operation.” FHFA, as conservator, will operate Fannie and
Freddie “until they are stabilized.” Federal Housing Finance Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James
B. Lockhart, Sept. 7, 2008, available at www.ofheo.gov/media/statements/FHFAStatement9708.pdf. In
response, the NLHIC noted that, while the statute gave FHFA the authority to “temporarily suspend”
Fannie and Freddie’s contributions to the new trust funds, infra note 187, such an action would not be
necessary for some time because contributions were not scheduled to begin until 2010. NAT’L LOW
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“principal duties [include ensuring] that the operations and activities of each
regulated entity foster liquid, efficient, competitive, and resilient national
housing finance markets (including activities relating to mortgages on housing
for low- and moderate-income families involving a reasonable economic return
that may be less than the return earned on other activities).”152
The Federal Housing Finance Oversight Board (FHFOB) is an advisory board
consisting of the secretaries of the Treasury and HUD, the chair of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, and the FHFA Director, who serves as chair.153 The
director’s responsibilities include establishing “prudential management and
operations standards” for the regulated entities,154 as well as standards for
portfolio holdings,155 risk-based capital requirements,156 and increasing mini-
mum capital levels when warranted.157
2. FHA Mortgage Refinance Insurance
The centerpiece of the foreclosure relief effort is a new FHA program to insure
mortgages issued to refinance existing single-family (1- to 4-family residences)
mortgages of owner-occupiers in danger of losing their homes.158 Loans to be
eligible for refinancing must have been made on or before December 31, 2007, by
borrowers who, as of March 1, 2008, have a mortgage debt to income ratio
greater than 35 percent and who certify that they own no other residence and have
not intentionally defaulted on the existing mortgage nor falsified information to
obtain the mortgage.159 Refinancing loans may not exceed 90% of the “current
appraised value” of the property160 and must have a single rate of interest “that is
fixed for the entire term of the mortgage, [which must] have a maturity of not less
than 30 years” from the date of refinancing.161
3. Homeowner Counseling
Counseling for homeowners and renters would be emphasized, with grants to
INCOME HOUS. COAL., MEMO TO MEMBERS, The Fannie/Freddie Takeover and the National Housing Trust
Fund, Vol. 13, No. 36, Sept. 12, 2008, at 1.
152. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 112 Stat. 2654, at § 1102
(amending § 1313 of the Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 4513)).
153. Id. at § 1103.
154. Id. at § 1108 (adding new § 1313B).
155. Id. at § 1109 (adding new § 1369E).
156. Id. at § 1110.
157. Id. at § 1111.
158. Id. at §§ 1401-1404 (HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008, adding new section 257 to Title II of
the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1707 et seq.).
159. Id. at § 1402(a).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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states and local governments authorized.162 In addition, state housing finance
agencies would receive a temporary increase in housing bond issue authority to
enable them to refinance “qualified subprime” loans, defined as “adjustable rate
single-family residential mortgage loan[s] made after December 31, 2001, and
before January 1, 2008, that the bond issuer determines would be reasonably
likely to cause financial hardship to the borrower if not refinanced.”163
B. Affordable Housing Trust Fund
1. State and Local Housing Trust Funds
For more than 20 years affordable housing advocates, assisted by the Housing
Trust Fund Project of the Center for Community Change, have worked to
establish dedicated sources of public funds to support affordable housing
efforts.164 Housing Trust Fund Project publications describe housing trust funds
as “distinct funds established by city, county or state governments to receive
ongoing dedicated sources of public funding.”165 They represent a “change
[from] reliance on annual budget allocations” to regular allocations of other
public funds such as land recording fees166 and real estate transfer taxes.167
According to the Housing Trust Fund Project, 38 states and the District of
Columbia, more than 550 cities and counties now operate housing trust funds that
annually make available more than $1.6 billion for affordable housing.168
2. Initial Efforts to Establish a National Housing Trust Fund
Beginning in the early 1990s, the Housing Trust Fund movement focused on
national legislation.169 Legislative leaders such as Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.)
and Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) led unsuccessful efforts to enact National
162. Id. at §§ 2401-02.
163. Id. at § 3021 (amending § 143(k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by adding new paragraph
(12)).
164. The Center for Community Change launched its Housing Trust Fund Project in 1986 to provide
information and technical assistance. Center for Community Change, Housing Trust Fund Project,
http://www.communitychange.org/our-projects/htf (last visited June 9, 2008).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 59.319.2-3 (2008) ($3.00 of real estate-related documents recording
fees devoted to the Missouri housing trust fund).
167. See, e.g., 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 200/31-10 (2006) (one half of the proceeds from a real estate
transfer tax of 50 cents per $500 value on the “privilege of transferring title” devoted to a state housing
trust fund).
168. Center for Community Change, supra note 164.
169. Laura Schwarz, Comment, The 2007 National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act: A National
Fund for a National Need, 17 J. AFF. HOUS. & COMM. DEV. L. 393, 398-399 (forthcoming 2008) (citing
Beth Parr, Note, Almost Home: Policy and Politics in the Campaign for a National Housing Trust Fund,
11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 321, 331-358 (2004) (summarizing earlier legislative efforts).
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Affordable Housing Trust Fund legislation.170 Despite the efforts of a strong
grass roots organization,171 the bills foundered over concerns about the principle
of creating a dedicated fund for affordable housing programs rather than
subjecting them to the regular appropriation process and questions about the
appropriate sources of funding.172
In late 2007, housing trust fund fortunes changed as the House of Representa-
tives approved, by a vote of 264-148, Rep. Frank’s bill, the National Affordable
Housing Trust Fund Act of 2007 (H.R. 2895).173 This was the first time that
housing trust fund legislation had been approved by one of the two branches of
Congress. Funding under the Frank bill was to come from profits generated by
FHA insurance premiums as well as a percentage (4.2 basis points/dollar) of the
unpaid principal balance of new business purchases by Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac.174 These sources were expected to provide between $800 million and $1
billion per year for the Housing Trust Fund,175 which would allocate the funds in
working toward the legislative goal of “produc[ing] 1,500,000 units of affordable
housing over the next decade.”176 The anticipated annual amounts are quite small
in relation to the need and the articulated goal,177 but sponsors and supporters
focused on the principle of a permanent fund dedicated to housing for extremely
low- and very low-income households rather than the amount the dedicated
source would generate.178 Once the principle was established, efforts to identify
additional sources would commence.
170. See, e.g., National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act of 2007, S. 2523, 110th Cong. (2007);
Federal Housing Finance Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1427, 110th Cong. (2007).
171. The National Housing Trust Fund Campaign is a nationwide coalition of organizations and
individuals led by the NLIHC that has supported the idea of a National Affordable Housing Trust Fund
since 1991. The coalition claims over 5600 endorsers of the Housing Trust Fund. NLIHC, National
Housing Trust Fund, available at http://www.nlihc.org/template/page.cfm?id40 (last visited June 13,
2008).
172. Laura Schwarz, supra note 169, at 395, n. 22 (citing Frank Alexander, Financing Affordable
Housing in Georgia: The Possibility of a Dedicated Revenue Source, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 363, 382
(1997)) (reviewing opposition to dedicated funds for housing).
173. National Housing Trust Fund: Victory: House Passes National Affordable Housing Trust Fund
Act, MEMO TO MEMBERS, Vol. 12, No. 40 (Nat’l Low Income Housing Coalition, Washington, D.C.), Oct.
12, 2007, at 1.
174. H. R. 2895, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007) (adding new §§ 291 & 292 to Title II of the
Cranston-Gonzalex National Affordable Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12721 et seq.); Id.
175. National Housing Trust Fund: Victory: House Passes National Affordable Housing Trust Fund
Act, supra note 173, at 3.
176. H.R. REP. NO. 110-362 at p. 15 (2007).
177. See Anuradha Kher, Housing Trust Fund Not Expected to Help Low-Income Housing Until 2010,
MULTI-HOUSING NEWS, Sept. 2, 2008, available at http://www.multihousingnews.com/multihousing/
content_display/industry-news/e3i9e7f602573f2a54401a2bc79a6b6cf95. Assuming a cost of $150,000
per unit, a fund of $800 million to $1 billion would enable between 5300 and 6500 housing units to be
added per year, less that 10% of the articulated annual goal.
178. See, e.g., NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., Details About the National Housing Trust Fund
Campaign, available at http://www.nhtf.org/detail/article.cfm?article_id3834#leg. (“The establish-
ment of a National Housing Trust Fund is intended to generate, new, additional dollars for
housing . . . .”)
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3. The 2008 Legislation
Prospects for the trust fund really picked up when the Senate Banking
Committee overwhelmingly approved a massive regulatory reform bill with a
housing trust fund provision similar to the one approved by the House.179 Section
131 of the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008, later
renumbered as § 1131 of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act, establishes
two trust funds, a HUD-managed Housing Trust Fund to support “production,
preservation, and rehabilitation” of rental housing and housing for homeowner-
ship180 and a Treasury Secretary-managed Capital Magnet Fund to support a
“competitive grant program to attract private capital” for affordable housing and
related economic development and community service activities.181
The main source of capital for the two trust funds will come from the House
formula for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as each agency is required to “set aside
an amount equal to 4.2 basis points (0.042%) for each dollar of the unpaid
principal balance of its total new business purchases,” and allocate 65% of that
amount to the Housing Trust fund and 35% to the Capital Magnet Fund,182 with
25% of the aggregate amount to be deposited in a reserve fund to support FHA
mortgage foreclosure relief efforts.183 While the FHA contribution provision in
the House bill184 was dropped from the final version, both funds also can receive
additional monies by appropriation, transfer or credit “under any other provision
of law.”185 Although HUD and Treasury have day-to-day fund management
responsibilities, the Director of the new oversight agency, FHFA,186 has
supervisory responsibilities to ensure that fund allocations do not cause financial
instability, undercapitalization or other interference with the enterprises, and to
prohibit the enterprises from passing their costs onto mortgage originators.187
While Housing Trust Fund and Capital Magnet Fund monies may be used only
for production and preservation of housing for low-income households, such
179. Senate Panel Okays Foreclosure Relief Bill with Amendment to Create Housing Trust Fund,
HOUS. & DEV. RPTR, June 2, 2008, at 323; James R. Hagerty & Damian Paletta, Oversight Compromise
Reached on Fannie, Freddie, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2008, at A3.
180. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, at § 1131 (adding § 1338 to the
Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992, 12 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.).
Section 131 “builds on the basic tenets of S. 2523,” the National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act of
2007, introduced by Senator John Kerry, D-Mass. Letter from Sheila Crowley, President and CEO,
NLIHC, to Sen. Kerry (June 5, 2008).
181. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, at § 1131 (adding § 1339).
182. Id., adding § 1337(a)(1)(A)-(B), (a)(2)(A)-(B). A basis point is 1/100th of a percent. “The
relationship between percentage changes and basis points can be summarized as follows: 1% change 
100 basis points, and 0.01%  1 basis point.” Investopedia, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/
basispoint.asp.
183. Id. at § 1337(e).
184. H. R. 2895, supra note 1, at §§ 1338(a)(1), 1339(b).
185. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, at §§ 1338(a)(1) and 1339(b).
186. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1.
187. Id. at § 1337(b), (c).
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funds may not be used to support economic development projects in which
eminent domain is used to acquire private property that will be transferred to
another private entity.188
4. Three Year Phase-In for Full Implementation
Full implementation of the Housing Trust Fund’s basic purpose, making grants
to states for production and preservation of rental units and increased homeown-
ership opportunities for ELI and VLI households, has been postponed for three
years.189 Funds will be allocated during the first three years of operation in
declining percentages to reimburse FHA for costs associated with proposed
refinancings to prevent foreclosures.190 Beginning in 2010, funds not allocated to
foreclosure relief efforts will be distributed as grants to states or state-designated
agencies such as state housing finance agencies, state housing and community
development entities, tribally designated housing entities, “or other qualified
instrumentalit[ies].”191 Distributions will be made in accordance with a needs-
based formula to be developed by HUD that includes the sum of four ratios: (i)
the ratio of the shortage of standard rental units that are “affordable and available
to extremely low-income renter households” in the state to the national shortage
of such units, (ii) the ratio of the shortage of similar units for very low-income
renter households, (iii) the ratio of extremely low-income renter households
living with incomplete kitchen or plumbing facilities, or more than one person
per room, or paying more than 50% of income for housing costs, and (iv) the ratio
of very low-income renter households living with the same housing concerns,
multiplied by the relative cost of construction in the state measured against
national costs.192
5. State Allocation Plans
States or state-designated entities and grantees will be required to prepare
allocation plans that are based on “priority housing needs” and are consistent
with established comprehensive housing affordability strategies (“CHAS”).193
Allocation plans must provide that funding priority will be based on “geographic
diversity,” ability to undertake activities in a “timely manner,” extent and
188. Id. at § 1337(f).
189. Id. at § 1338(a).
190. Id. at § 1338(b)(1) (100% in calendar year 2009, 50% in 2010 and 25% in 2011).
191. Id. at § 1338(c).
192. Id. at § 1338(c)(3)(B).
193. 42 U.S.C § 12705 (2006). “Priority housing needs” are to be identified by state agencies based on
statutory and regulatory criteria that emphasize geographic diversity, ability to undertake activities in a
timely manner, affordability for extremely low-income families, use of other funding sources, and the
merits of a particular proposal. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, §§ 1338(c)
(5) (A)(ii), 1338 (g) (2) (D).
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duration of affordable rents for ELI families, extent to which other funds will be
used and the merits of a particular proposal.194 “Geographic diversity” is not
defined in this section, but in the Capital Magnet Fund section it is defined as
including “those areas that meet objective criteria of economic distress as
developed by the Secretary of the Treasury, which may include –
(i) the percentage of low-income families or the extent of poverty;
(ii) the rate of unemployment or underemployment;
(iii) extent of blight and disinvestment;
(iv) projects that target extremely low, very low, and low-income families in
or outside a designated economic distress area; or
(v) any other criteria designated by the Secretary of the Treasury.”195
Presumably the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development will use the same
or similar approach in defining “geographic diversity” for the Housing Trust
Fund.
Eligible activities include “production, preservation, and rehabilitation,” as
well as operating costs, of rental housing, with at least 75% of the funds required
to benefit ELI families and 25% VLI families, and homeownership opportunities
for ELI and VLI first-time homebuyers who have completed a financial education
and counseling program from an approved counseling agency,196 but only 10% of
trust fund monies can be used for homeownership support.197 Eligible grant
recipients include both for-profit and nonprofit organizations which demonstrate
experience, financial and organizational capacity, ability, familiarity with the
requirements of other housing programs, and provide assurances of compliance
with program and statutory standards.198
C. Capital Magnet Fund
The Capital Magnet Fund established by the Act will utilize its 35% share of
the GSE fund allocation199 for a “competitive grant program to attract private
capital for and increase investment in” affordable housing for ELI, VLI and LI
families, as well as economic development activities or community service
facilities, “which in conjunction with affordable housing activities implement a
concerted strategy to stabilize or revitalize a low-income area or underserved
194. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, §§ 1338(c)(5)(A), 1338(g)(2)(D).
195. Id. at § 1339(h)(2)(B).
196. Id. at § 1338(c)(7)(A)-(B) (Section 132 of the Act creates a new financial education and
counseling grant program in the Treasury Department).
197. Id. at § 1338(c)(10)(A).
198. Id. at § 1338(c)(9).
199. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, at § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).
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rural area.”200 Eligible grantees include Treasury certified community develop-
ment financial institutions and nonprofit affordable housing development or
management organizations.201
Grants from the fund may be used to provide loan loss reserves, to capitalize
revolving loan, affordable housing or economic development loan funds, or to
make risk-sharing loans,202 all of which “shall be reasonably expected” to result
in developments that leverage the grant funds by at least a ratio of 10 to 1.203 As is
the case for the Housing Trust Fund, monies from the Capital Magnet Fund are to
be distributed under the principle of “geographic diversity.”204
IV. THE POTENTIAL OF AND CHALLENGES TO A NATIONAL HOUSING TRUST FUND
The devastating effect of the subprime mortgage foreclosure crisis on
low-income homeowners, renters and their neighborhoods205 has exposed the
weakness of a housing policy centered on homeownership. While homeowner-
ship has been at the heart of U.S. housing policy since the creation of FHA and
the GSEs in the 1930s, support for low and moderate income renters also was
expressed through the public housing,206 section 221,207 section 236208 and
section 8209 programs, as well as the low-income housing tax credit (“LIHTC”).210
But over the years, local controversies, program weaknesses and an increasing
tilt toward encouraging homeownership have caused public and financial support
for these programs to be sharply reduced. Even in the midst of arguably the most
severe housing emergency since the Great Depression,211 little public concern
has been noted for the housing needs of low-income households:
Thus far, there has been little national outcry about the fact that growing
numbers of low-and middle-income families are spending half or more of their
incomes on housing, and that so many children are living in unhealthy, unsafe
conditions—or, worse yet, forced to make their way on the streets. The grim
200. Id. at § 1339(c) (citing day care centers, workforce development centers, and health care centers
as examples of community service facilities).
201. Id. at § 1339(e).
202. Id. at § 1339(f).
203. Id. at § 1339(h)(3).
204. Id. at § 1339(h)(2). See supra note 195.
205. See supra Part III.
206. See United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437.
207. Pub. L. 560, § 221, tit. I, § 123, 68 Stat. 599 (1954) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715l (2000)).
208. Pub. L. 90-448, tit. I, § 236, 82 Stat. 476 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (2000)).
209. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 8, 88 Stat. 633, 748
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2000)).
210. Tax Reform Act of 1986, I.R.C. § 42 (2000).
211. Patrick Fitzgibbons, Bernake Offers Bleak Outlook, BOSTON GLOBE (Sept. 24, 2008) available at
http://www.boston.com.business/articles/2008/09/24/bernake_offers_bleak_outlook_1222273058/ (“The
most severe U.S. housing slump since the Great Depression has sent foreclosures soaring, saddling the
global financial system with a mountain of bad debt that has threatened to choke off the supply of credit”).
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plight of many veterans has also failed to rally a groundswell of support to
tackle these urgent issues.212
The long journey of the national Housing Trust Fund legislation attests to the
general absence of affordable housing issues on the nation’s recent public
agenda.
A. Trust Fund Potential: Restoring a Balanced Housing Policy
Establishment of a national Housing Trust Fund with a dedicated source of
funding pledged by law to support housing for the extremely low-income and
very low-income cohorts accomplishes several things. The Federal Government
becomes committed to providing predictable and regular financial support for
additional housing production, primarily rental and affordable, to the ELI and
VLI cohorts. States and local entities that have gained valuable experience
through the administration of their own housing programs over the last several
decades receive a substantial infusion of new monies. These funds enable
qualified state and local entities, both public and private, to respond to the
increasingly severe housing needs of families least able to compete effectively
for such housing in the private market.
Inclusion of the national Housing Trust Fund in the foreclosure relief
legislation acknowledges the important point that renters as well as homeowners
are affected by the foreclosure crisis. And while the focus of the Housing Trust
Fund should remain on the housing needs of extremely low-income and very
low-income renters, the allocation of Housing Trust Fund monies in the first
years of operation to foreclosure relief programs represents a reasonable
compromise and a recognition that enabling as many homeowners as possible to
save their homes is a critical step toward stabilizing the overall housing market.
The subprime mortgage-foreclosure crisis213 is a wake-up call to policy
makers and the public. Homeownership status is justifiably valued, both by
individuals and their communities, and merits public support. But the subprime
mortgage-foreclosure crisis also is a sobering reminder that homeownership “can
be a very risky venture”214 and is not for everyone.215 Millions of Americans rent
their housing, either because they cannot afford to purchase a house or because
212. HARV. JOINT CTR., supra note 65, at 31.
213. See supra notes 55-145 and accompanying text. The availability of adjustable rate mortgages,
which offered very low introductory interest rates, enabled millions of lower-income households to
become homeowners during the housing boom of the 1990s and early 2000s. When those rates began to
reset a few years later, mortgage payments increased sharply, in many cases to a level that was
unaffordable, leading to default and foreclosure.
214. Rachel Swarns, supra note 43, quoting William C. Apgar, a senior scholar at the Joint Center for
Housing Studies at Harvard University and a former FHA Commissioner. See also, Anne B. Shlay, supra
note 18, at pp. 516, 527 (arguing that “research on the demand side suggests that the market for
low-income homeownership has a limit” and noting that “elevation of low-income homeownership to its
current status has deflected political attention away from other policies for affordable housing”). The
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they prefer to rent.216 Most households in the extremely low-income cohort have
no choice but to rent,217 and increasing numbers of them are threatened with the
loss of their rental units because of foreclosure actions against their landlords.
National housing policy that does not recognize these realities is seriously
deficient.
As policy analysts at the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard
University have pointed out, the foreclosure crisis provides an opportunity to
restore balance in housing policy by refocusing on the potential of rental
housing.218 The Housing Trust Fund could become the vehicle for establishing
that balance by providing necessary financial support for state and local
affordable housing initiatives, and through that process, helping to regain public
confidence in government-sponsored housing efforts. After the initial emphasis
on reimbursing FHA for costs associated with refinancings to prevent foreclo-
sure,219 Housing Trust Fund allocations could be used in a number of creative
ways to support rental housing.
For example, financial support could be provided to local not-for-profit
“community preservation funds” to enable them to acquire properties that have
Center for Responsible Lending report, supra, note 71, at pp. 22-29, discusses the “costs and causes of
unsustainable homeownership” (emphasis added).
215. In some respects, the subprime mortgage foreclosure crisis resembles a home ownership-driven
crisis in the early 1970s. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Act of Aug. 1, 1968, Pub. L.
90-448, 82 Stat. 476, introduced a new program of interest subsidies to banks, Section 235, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715z (2000), that enabled qualifying home buyers to be charged only 1% interest on their home loans.
This program piggy-backed onto a 1960s extension of FHA mortgage insurance to persons of moderate
income, Section 221(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. 1715l (d)(2) (2000), which permitted down payments as low as
$200. For a variety of reasons, 235/221(d) (2) home loans were made to numerous low-income
households. While technically they may have “qualified” for such loans, many did not have the financial
resources to handle the costs associated with homeownership such as utilities, insurance, maintenance
and taxes. When this income/expense gap became apparent, many homeowners abandoned their houses
or lost them to foreclosure, leaving whole neighborhoods vacant. The 235 program and its rental
counterpart, Section 236, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (1) (2000), were suspended by President Nixon in January,
1973 and, while the programs are still on the statute books, they have not played a serious role in housing
since then. For a case study focusing on St. Louis, Missouri, see Harry B. Wilson, Jr., Comment,
Exploiting the Home-Buying Poor: A Case Study of Abuse of the National Housing Act, 17 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 525 (1973) (citing inter alia Hearings on Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages Before the Legal
and Monetary Affairs Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 290 (testimony of George Romney, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, May 3, 1972);
President’s Message on the Quality of Life in the Cities, 119 CONG. REC. H1517 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1973)).
216. Joint Center, supra note 65, at 6 (noting that nearly 37 million households rented in 2005).
217. Shlay, supra note 18, at 516-517 (discussing research findings that “homeownership remained
unaffordable for about 80 percent of renters, [which] represents 21 million renter families,” because they
lacked sufficient income and assets).
218. HARV. JOINT CTR., supra note 65, at 19 (“now is a good time to develop initiatives that would
transform the large inventory of foreclosed properties into the next generation of affordable rental
housing”).
219. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, at § 1401-1404.
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been foreclosed and restore them to local rental markets.220 Support for such
funds could help solidify the momentum expected to be provided by an
emergency, one-time $4 billion infusion of Community Development Block
Grant (“CDBG”) funds earmarked for “the redevelopment of abandoned and
foreclosed upon homes and residential properties.”221 Community land trusts
(“CLTs”) could be assisted in their efforts to acquire land on which affordable
rental as well as ownership housing would be constructed and operated.222 New
affordable rental units could become part of transit-oriented development in
suburban locations where service-oriented jobs tend to cluster.223
Initial funding of the Housing Trust Fund will be modest.224 The $800 million
to $1 billion per year that the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac fees are expected to
provide225 doesn’t even match the $1.6 billion generated annually by the over
600 state and local housing trust funds in existence,226 nor would it provide more
than seed money in support of the announced goal of producing “1,500,000 units
of affordable housing over the next decade.”227 The significance of the legislation
lies primarily in the facts that it manifests recognition of the severe housing
burdens of extremely low- and very low-income households and establishes a
mechanism for the allocation of “dedicated funding sources of revenue” to
support housing production, preservation and rehabilitation programs “for the
nation’s lowest income households”228 and undertakes to implement state and
220. Joint Center, supra note 65, at 23. This recommendation anticipates the reality that not all
homeowners in default will be able to be saved through the new FHA refinancing program, supra note
158.
221. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, at § 2301. A small portion of the $4
billion appropriation, $180,000,000, is set aside for home ownership counseling. Id. at § 2305.
222. For a discussion of the potential for community land trusts, see JOHN EMMEUS DAVIS AND RICK
JACOBUS, THE CITY—CLT PARTNERSHIP: MUNICIPAL SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY LAND TRUSTS (2008)
(focusing on the home ownership potential of CLTs and emphasizing their roles as stewards of both the
land and housing built on that land, and as trustees of the subsidies provided for that housing).
223. Transit-oriented development emphasizes the desirability of, and need for, relatively high
density, mixed-use and pedestrian-friendly development located in the vicinity of public transit stops and
stations. See, e.g., HANK DITTMAR AND GLORIA OHLAND, THE NEW TRANSIT TOWN: BEST PRACTICES IN
TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT (2004); JAMES A. KUSHNER, THE POST-AUTOMOBILE CITY: LEGAL
MECHANISMS TO ESTABLISH THE PEDESTRIAN-FRIENDLY CITY (2004).
224. And while the Housing Trust Fund has a dedicated source of revenue, dedicated sources do not
remove all uncertainties regarding availability of funds. As users of the Highway Trust Fund are
discovering, the spike in gasoline prices to the $4.00 range during the summer of 2008 caused a severe
reduction in gasoline purchase and a corresponding reduction in Highway Trust Fund receipts.
Christopher Conkey, Funds for Highways Plummet As Drivers Cut Gasoline Use, WALL ST. J., July 28,
2008, at A1.
225. H.R. REP. NO. 110-362 (2007).
226. Id. at 16.
227. Id. at 15. An annual fund of $1 billion dollars spread evenly over 150,000 units would make
available only $6667 per unit.
228. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., NAT’L HOUS. TRUST FUND 1 (June 9, 2008), available at
http://www.nlihc.org/template/page.cfm?id40 (last visited July 11, 2008).
No. 1] 43National Affordable Housing Trust Fund
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1444383
local affordable housing plans.229
B. Housing Trust Fund Challenges
Despite the overwhelming votes of support in both the House and the Senate,
which admittedly may have been for the overall foreclosure response of the final
legislative package, the idea of a national Housing Trust Fund has been and
remains controversial. The report of the House Committee on Financial Services
accompanying Rep. Frank’s trust fund bill, H.R. 2895,230 contained a sharply-
worded dissent signed by 13 members of the Committee when it was sent to the
House floor.
The dissenters raised four main objections: 1) “[s]iphoning money” from the
GSEs and the FHA programs for the Trust Fund would amount to a “tax on
middle-income homeowners seeking to purchase a home or refinance an existing
mortgage through FHA,” 2) decisions regarding affordable housing production
“are best managed through state and local housing trust funds rather than through
a new federal bureaucracy” which could take “months and even years” to become
fully operational, 3) making the trust fund a “set-aside” within the existing
HOME Investment Partnership Program231 is preferable to creating a new
program that is “essentially the same program,” and 4) “political considerations
will inevitably enter into the grant process administered by state and local
government agencies,” despite provisions in the bill to prevent misuse of
funds.232
1. A “Middle-Class Mortgage Tax”?
A major source of contention over the years has been the proper source or
sources of monies for a national housing trust fund.233 The search has been for
229. The last Federal program directly supporting the production of affordable rental housing for very
low-income households was the Section 8 New Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation program,
established in 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f), and terminated in 1983, Pub. L. 98-181, § 209(a)(1)
(substituting “existing housing” for “existing, newly constructed, and substantially rehabilitated housing)
in a shift from supply-side to demand-side emphasis in the Section 8 program. The last new housing
program was the HOME Investment Partnership program, established in 1990, which focuses on
households in the 60-80% of median income range. HOME Investment Partnerships, Pub. L. 101-625,
104 Stat. 4096 (1990) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 12741- 12756 (2000)). The only Federal housing
program that has served the extremely low-income cohort is the public housing program, United States
Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000)), which helped finance the
construction of approximately 1.5 million units, primarily in the 1950s through 1970s, but ceased
supporting production of new public housing units in the 1980s to concentrate on management of units
already in the public housing inventory.
230. H.R. REP. NO. 110-362, at 57-59.
231. The HOME program authorization is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12741 ff (2000).
232. H.R. REP. NO. 110-362, at 57-59.
233. The original proposal called for modifications to three tax benefits enjoyed by homeowners, the
mortgage interest tax deduction, 26 U.S.C. § 163, the property tax deduction, 26 U.S.C. § 164, and
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“dedicated sources of revenue . . . that would support additional housing
activities [and not] supplant existing federal, state or local appropriations or other
existing funding sources for affordable housing activities.”234 Earlier unsuccess-
ful efforts focused on homeownership tax deductions235 and surplus funds in the
FHA Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund.236 From 2002 to 2007, housing trust fund
bills were introduced on a regular basis. But despite strong grass roots support, no
final action was taken until enactment of the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008 in July of that year.
The shift to a focus on the GSEs’ portfolios recognizes the importance of the
GSEs to housing finance and of the resources available to them. That focus also
recognizes the public-private partnership aspect of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
As government sponsored enterprises they have both public and private
characteristics. The public aspect is evidenced by “a $2.25 billion line of credit
with the U.S. Treasury” which enables them to borrow more cheaply than private
entities, plus the fact that they are not subject to regulation by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and are exempt from state and local income taxes as well
as state securities laws.237 The private aspect is the fact that they are owned by
shareholders who seek a profit from their investments.238
Reasons for tapping GSE resources for the Trust Fund include (1) the “special
charters from Congress that give [GSEs] special treatment” noted above and (2)
the fact that “their charters limit their business activities to purchasing home
mortgages and supporting affordable housing.”239 Supporters view GSE partici-
pation in Housing Trust Fund funding as consistent with the GSEs’ affordable
special capital gains rules for the sale of a home upon the death of the homeowner, 26 U.S.C. § 1014, Parr,
supra note 169, at 331, citing NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., PROPOSED FED. HOUS. TRUST FUND 10-12
(1995). See, also, Nancy Bernstine and Irene Basloe Saraf, New Rental Production and the National
Housing Trust Fund Campaign, 12 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & COMTY. DEV. L. 389, 390-395 (2003) (discussing
proposals to allocate surplus funds from the FHA’s Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, 12 U.S.C. § 1708
(2003)); see sources cited supra note 172; Schwarz, Comment, supra note 169.
234. Id. at 16.
235. Parr, supra note 169, at 331.
236. House Report 362 at 17-18 (citing H.R. 3995, the “Housing Affordability for America Act of
2002” (matching grants to state and local housing trust funds)); H.R. 2349; H.R. 1102 (2004). See also
H.R. 4347, 109th Cong. (2005) and the “Bringing America Home Act of 2006” (H.R. 2897).
237. RICHARD WILLIAMS, ALTERNATIVE ASSESSMENTS OF GSE PERFORMANCE, INFLUENCE, AND IMPACT
1993-2003 (2006), at 3, available at www.huduser.org (citing HUD’s Proposed Housing Goal Rule –
2004, available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/gse/summary.doc. The new legislation makes explicit
an implicit commitment by the federal government to honor commitments of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to expand the line of credit and, in necessary, to buy
equity shares in the two agencies. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, supra note 1, at § 1117.
238. One study estimated that the GSEs retained $3.9 billion in 2000 from $13.6 billion in benefits
from their special status. Williams, supra note 226, citing Dan L. Crippen, Federal Subsidies for the
Housing GSEs, Statement to the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government
Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, May 23, 2001.
239. OPEN CRS, CREATING GSE AFFORDABLE HOUSING FUNDS: PROPOSED LEGISLATION IN THE 110TH
CONGRESS, RL34158 (Sept. 5, 2007), available at http://opencrs.cdt.org/documents/RL34158 (last
visited June 17, 2008).
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housing support mandate,240 even though 90% of the funds would be earmarked
for support of rental housing, because the GSE emphasis on encouraging
homeownership may well have contributed to the subprime foreclosure crisis by
encouraging a relaxation of prudent lending standards.241
The dissenters on the House Financial Services Committee questioned the use
of GSE assessments and FHA surpluses to fund a new housing program for
low-income households. “When it comes to meeting the affordable housing
needs of our very low-income citizens, there simply has to be a better way than
imposing what amounts to a middle-class mortgage tax on the millions of
Americans whose mortgages are financed by the GSEs. . . .”242
The dissenters have a point. The primary mission of the GSEs has been and
continues to be the support of homeownership. Diverting funds from that
essential mission appears to compromise that mission. But homeownership is not
for everyone, and the evidence is mounting that preoccupation with increasing
the number of lower income homeowners was counterproductive.243 Households
that have benefited from GSE purchases of their mortgages clearly have received
support, perhaps even a subsidy,244 from an entity with close ties to the Federal
Government. Given the importance of affordable housing for all segments of
American society,245 the evidence from the recent housing bust that homeowner-
ship is not for everyone in all stages of their lives, and the huge role the GSEs
play in the American housing market,246 diverting a small percentage of their
resources to an affordable rental housing program for ELI and VLI households,
240. See supra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
241. Leonnig, supra note 144.
242. Id. at 58.
243. The authors of a Washington Post article in an investigative report series retracing the housing
boom and bust cycle commented that “[t]here was something very new about this particular housing
boom. Much of it was driven by loans made to a new category of borrowers – those with little savings,
modest income or checkered credit histories.” Alec Klein and Zachary A. Goldfarb, The Bubble: How
Homeowners, Speculators and Wall Street Dealmakers Rode a Wave of Easy Money with Crippling
Consequences, WASH. POST, June 15, 2008, at p. A1.
244. Of course, the recipients of that support may not see it as support or even a subsidy. Many people,
for example, believe that the mortgage interest deduction, which is so important to the home ownership
psyche, is nothing short of an entitlement.
245. The report accompanying H.R. 2895 cites the following findings of the Joint Center for Housing
Studies of Harvard University State of the Nation’s Housing Report 2007.
[I]n just one year, the number of households with housing cost burdens in excess of 30 percent
of income climbed by 2.3 million, hitting a record 37.3 million in 2005. The number of
American households paying more than half their incomes on housing increased to 17 million
in 2005, with one in seven U.S. households being “severely housing cost burdened” in that
year. Nearly one-half of low-income households, a total of 8.2 million renters and 5 million
homeowners, have severe cost burdens. The study indicates that about 750,000 persons are
homeless on any given night . . . .
Supra note 176, at 16.
246. In May, 2008 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac held $1.5 trillion worth of mortgages and had
guaranteed another $3.9 trillion worth of mortgages, together amounting to about half the stated value of
outstanding residential mortgages. Charles Duhigg, Putting Their Houses in Order, N.Y. TIMES, July 12,
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for whom homeownership may be an unrealistic dream, appears more consistent,
rather than less consistent, with their affordable housing-support mandate.247
2. A New Federal Bureaucracy?
The Housing Trust Fund is to be lodged in HUD, causing the dissenters to
complain that the resulting “new federal bureaucracy” could take years to make
the program operational. In their opinion, state and local housing trust funds
should manage housing production programs.248 But that is essentially what the
Housing Trust Fund legislation provides. HUD’s job is to “establish and manage”
the Fund, develop a statutorily-prescribed formula for distributions of Housing
Trust Fund monies to each state,249 approve statutorily-required state allocation
plans,250 and implement an accountability program of funds distributed by state
recipients.251 Distribution of funds for specific programs and activities will be
administered by the recipient states, localities and Indian Tribes.
3. A “Set Aside” Under HOME?
Objectors to the Trust Fund legislation also argue that, if there is to be a new
housing program, a more efficient approach would be to fold the program into the
existing HOME program,252 a targeted housing block grant program conceptu-
ally similar to the Community Development Block Grant (“CDBG”) program.253
While the HOME program has a philosophy that is similar to the Trust Fund
program in that decisions on how the money is to be spent are made at the local
and state levels rather than the national level, HOME has a separate set of
requirements that may limit its flexibility and is targeted to a different income
cohort, households in the 60-80% of median income range.254 HOME also
requires annual appropriations of general revenue and thus is subject to the
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/12/business/12expense.html?th&emcth&
pagewantedprint.
247. A possible alternative source of funding for a national HTF, discussed in the early years of the
HTF debate and as a mechanism for reducing high deficits in the early 1990s, could be derived from a cap
on the amount of federal tax revenue foregone as a result of the mortgage interest tax deduction available
to homeowners who itemize deductions on their federal income tax returns, I.R.C § 163(a) & (h) (2002).
See, e.g., Peter Salsich, A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949 Goal Be Met? 71 N. C. L. REV.
1619, 1634-1637 (1993).
248. Center for Community Change, supra note 168.
249. 12 U.S.C. § 4562.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 4562.
251. 12 U.S.C. § 4562.
252. 42 U.S.C. § 12741. Laura Schwarz, while supporting the final bill, also had strong arguments for
the HOME set aside approach. See Schwarz, supra note 169 at 410.
253. The CDBG program authorization is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.
254. For example, HOME funds may not be used to provide tenant-based rental assistance that
replicates Section 8 assistance, or to provide support for public housing capital investment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12742.
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vagaries of the federal budget process, making it difficult for fund recipients to
make long-term funding commitments.255
Supporters of the Housing Trust Fund concept also feared that folding the
Housing Trust Fund into HOME would inevitably result in competition for
current levels of HOME appropriations rather than an infusion of new monies.
The Housing Trust Fund concept is designed to emphasize the importance of
securing additional funding sources to make possible the realization of an
ambitious goal of producing 1,500,000 new or substantially rehabilitated housing
units over a 10-year period, rather than simply reallocating funds from one
program to another.256 While many factors will influence affordable housing
production during that decade, the establishment of a dedicated, regular and
predictable source of revenue for the Housing Trust Fund provides a structure to
make possible the realization of that goal.257
4. Will Political Considerations Affect Local Decisions?
Despite many safeguards against misuse of funds in the legislation, including
prohibitions against use of funds for recipient administrative costs and political
activities, grantee limits on administrative costs, required program regulations,
HUD audit responsibility and authority to impose penalties for failure to comply
with HUD regulations, opponents worry that “political considerations will
inevitably enter into the grant process administered by state and local govern-
ment agencies.”258 Again, they have a point. Any program that dispenses large
sums of money has the “potential . . . to be used to benefit elected officials and
reward their political supporters.”259
But states and localities have gained valuable experience in the administration
of housing production programs in the 30 plus years since the Federal
Government withdrew from direct housing production support with the cancella-
tion of the Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation programs,260
and the shift to indirect support of housing production through the Low Income
Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”) program.261 The experience gained by state
housing finance agencies in the administration of tax exempt housing bond
255. 42 U.S.C. § 12744.
256. H.R. REP. NO. 110-362, at 27 (2007).
257. Of course, setting a goal doesn’t guarantee realization of that goal. For a look back at ambitious
housing goals set in 1968 that fell far short of their marks, see John Charles Boger, Race and the
American City: The Kerner Commission in Retrospect – An Introduction, 71 N.C L. REV. 1289 (1993).
258. H.R. REP. NO. 110-362, at 58-59.
259. Id, at 59. See also, Peter Salsich, et al., Affordable Workforce Housing—An Agenda for the Show
Me State: A Report from an Interactive Forum on Housing Issues in Missouri, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 45, 53, n. 62 (citing Nancy Cambria, Nixon Alleges ‘Secret Bailout’for O’Fallon Project: He Assails
Members of Housing Panel, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 4, 2007, at B2 (reporting on controversial
project support by Missouri Housing Development Commission)).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (2000).
261. I.R.C. § 42 (2008) (enacted in 1986).
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programs, LIHTC allocations and state housing trust funds,262 coupled with
lessons derived263 from the local planning process built into the CDBG program
through the Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy (“CHAS”) pro-
gram,264 belies the notion that states and localities do not have the wherewithal to
administer an effective national Housing Trust Fund program.
5. Exclusionary Pressure at the Local Level
Perhaps the most serious threat to the success of any new rental housing
production program is the prevalence of local land use regulations, and public
attitudes favoring single family ownership and severely restricting or prohibiting
multifamily rental units within residential areas. The legacy of the Supreme
Court’s approval of single-family zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co.265 and the FHA’s insistence on the imposition of restrictive land use
regulations in new FHA-insured suburban developments in the 1940s and
1950s266 is a predominance of residential neighborhoods dominated by single
family housing.267 Land use regulatory policies favoring, or even requiring, 1800
square-foot single-family detached houses on relatively large lots (e.g., one-sixth
of an acre or larger)268 and rejecting multi-family developments are by definition
hostile to the ELI and VLI cohorts because of the higher costs of such housing. In
the words of analysts at the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard
University:
In many markets, zoning restrictions, minimum lot sizes, lengthy permitting
and approval processes, and voter opposition to specific kinds of developments
make the construction of affordable rental housing more difficult and therefore
more expensive.269
262. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF STATE HOUSING AGENCIES, STATE HFA FACT BOOK (2005).
263. For a review of housing planning policies, see MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., THE URBAN
INST., PLANNING TO MEET LOCAL HOUSING NEEDS: THE ROLE OF HUD’S CONSOLIDATED PLANNING
REQUIREMENTS IN THE 1990S (2002).
264. CHAS regulations are found at 24 C.F.R. pt. 91.
265. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
266. For a discussion of FHA policies during the post-war era, see Adam Gordon, The Creation of
Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership
Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L.J. 186 (2005).
267. See generally ROLF PENDALL ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., FROM TRADITIONAL TO REFORMED: A
REVIEW OF THE LAND USE REGULATIONS IN THE NATION’S 50 LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS (2006),
available at http://media.brookings.edu/mediaarchive/pubs/metro/pubs/20060810_LandUse.pdf.
268. Median house and lot sizes in 2007 were reported to be 1769 square feet (house size) and
0.35/acre (lot size). U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV. & U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMN. HOUS. SURVEY
FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2007 (Sept. 2008).
269. HARV. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES, supra note 65, at 20.
No. 1] 49National Affordable Housing Trust Fund
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1444383
That issue requires “head on” confrontation270 because of the adverse impact
such policies could have on the cost and availability of housing located near job
opportunities,271 as well as on the ability of organizations using the Housing
Trust Fund programs to provide ELI-and VLI-affordable housing near such job
opportunities.
The House-passed version of Housing Trust Fund legislation contained a
creative, but limited, approach to restrictive land use regulations. H.R. 2895
required grantees to provide matching funds at the rate of 25 percent if federal
funds are used for the match and 12.5 percent if the match comes from state, local
or private funds.272 However, the match is reduced or waived in cases where “any
variance from zoning laws or other waiver of regulatory requirements was
approved by the local jurisdiction” in order to permit the activity which is to be
assisted by Trust Fund monies.273
CONCLUSION
Enactment of the Housing Trust Fund legislation marks the return of the
Federal Government as a direct participant in the production and preservation of
housing, primarily rental, that will be affordable to ELI and VLI households.
Motivated by arguably the most severe housing crisis in several generations,274
and spurred on by a dedicated coalition of advocates spanning the 50 states,275
Congressional approval of the Housing Trust Fund marks the beginning of what
could be a turn toward a more balanced housing policy that gives due regard to
the fact that not everyone can afford to own a home. The permanent nature of the
funding mechanism gives states and local governments, as well as other
interested parties, a greater opportunity to plan and implement effective housing
production and preservation programs, confident of direct Federal support
without a stultifying “one size fits all” national mandate.276
No program is perfect, and the new Housing Trust Fund program has its
270. Id. at 22. See also, GERRIT KNAAP, STUART MECK, TERRY MOORE, AND ROBERT PARKER, ZONING
AS A BARRIER TO MULTIFAMILY HOUSING, APA PAS REPORT 548 (2007); NAHB RESEARCH CENTER,
STUDY OF SUBDIVISION REQUIREMENTS AS A REGULATORY BARRIER (2007), available at http://
www.huduser.org/publications/commdevl/subdiv_report.html.
271. Reconnecting America, a national non-profit organization that supports integration of transporta-
tion systems with the communities they serve, has published two recent reports on the jobs-housing-
transportation connection, REALIZING THE POTENTIAL: EXPANDING HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES NEAR TRANSIT
(May 2007) and PRESERVING OPPORTUNITIES SAVING AFFORDABLE HOMES NEAR TRANSIT (undated),
available at http://www.reconnectingamerica.org/public/reports.
272. National Affordable Housing Trust Fund Act of 2007, H.R. 2895, 110th Cong. § 294(f)(1)(A) &
(B) (2007).
273. Id. at § 294(f)(4).
274. See e.g., HARV. JOINT CTR., supra note 65, at 4 (“most industry experts predict loans originated in
2006 and 2007 will be the most foreclosure-prone in history”).
275. See supra notes 164-168 and accompanying text.
276. This is not meant to suggest that the Housing Trust Fund program should be devoid of regulation.
Rather, the quest will be for the “right” regulation. NPR Marketplace, Crisis Calls for the Right
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limitations, particularly in the amount of funds to be available relative to the
housing goal supporters have advanced. It will take time for regulations to be
adopted and plans to be developed. No one can guarantee that the goal of
1,500,000 new, preserved or rehabilitated housing units for the ELI and VLI
cohorts will be reached anytime soon. Previous experience with affordable
housing goals does not provide grounds for optimism.277 However, the presence
of a dedicated national housing fund with a permanent source of revenue and a
legislative invitation to pursue additional sources of funding,278 along with a far
more sophisticated infrastructure of state and local housing organizations than
existed during the housing initiatives in the 1960s and 1970s offers hope that
substantial progress can be made in responding to the very serious housing needs
of extremely-low and very-low income households. Reliance on a private
sector-driven, homeownership-oriented approach did not succeed, as the current
foreclosure crisis makes clear.
Homeownership has long been the American dream—one that has been
strongly supported by public policy.279 The loss of that dream for so many
American households because of the subprime mortgage melt-down is tragic. But
lessons can and should be taken from that tragedy. One clear lesson is the risk
associated with home ownership and the need for that risk to be tempered by
greater acceptance of rental housing and a corresponding relaxation of pressures
on agencies and individuals to push homeownership on people who do not have
the resources to succeed with homeownership. The new Housing Trust Fund
legislation is a strong step in that direction.
Regulation, October 9, 2008 (comments of Will Wilkinson, research fellow at the Cato Institute, on the
current financial crisis).
277. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No 90-448, 82 Stat. 476,
established a goal of six million affordable housing units over a ten year period, but implementation never
exceeded 10 percent of the annual goals. Boger, supra note 257, at 1332, n. 188.
278. Additional monies can come by appropriation, transfer or credit “under any other provision of
law.” See supra, note 185 and accompanying text. The Obama Administration’s 2010 budget and both the
House and Senate 2010 budget resolutions propose allocating $1 billion to the National Housing Trust
Fund. A source for the funds was not identified in the early drafts of the budget resolutions. NLIHC,
Advocates Hope Spring Showers Will Bring Legislative Flowers, 14 MEMO TO MEMBERS No. 15, April 17,
2009, at 2. The NLIHC is proposing “an annual distribution of $5 billion” as a “short term goal.” NLIHC,
The New National Housing Trust Fund Frequently Asked Questions, at 3, available at www.nhtf.org (last
visited Apr. 17, 2009).
279. The mortgage interest tax deduction, I.R.C. § 163(a), (h) (1)-(3) (2002), and related tax
provisions favoring home ownership comprise the second largest tax expenditure (revenue foregone) in
the federal budget. The first Housing Trust Fund bills in the early 1990s would have generated over $20
billion annually by reducing progressively the size of homeownership tax preferences. Parr, supra note
169, at 331.
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